The development of pragmatism up to 1910 by Davis, John Whitney,
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1949
















( A»B*> Boston University, 19^7 )
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the















I. THE BEGINNINGS OF PRAGMATISM. 6
1. Idealism the reigning system «... 6
2* The Pragmaticism of Peirce 3
a* Introduction 8
b* The Origin of the Term 10
c« Pragmatism as Philosophic Method l4
d. Pragmatism and Logic l4
e« Pragmatism and Metaphysics 1^
f* Pragmatism and Truth 18
g* Pragmatism and Psychology 19
II. THE PRAGMATISM OF JAMES 22
1. Introduction 22
2. The Doctrine of Radical Empiricism 25
a. An Exposition 25
b. Fite's Criticism of Radical Empiricism 50
c. The Miller-Bode Objection 52
5* The Development of James's Pragmatism 55
h. The Defense of Pragmatism 40
III. JOHN DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM 48
1. Introduction 48
2. A Biographical Sketch of Dewey 49
5. Dewey's Conception of Philosophy 50





The Logical Basie of Instrumentalism 62
6. Dewey's Contribution to Pragmatism 68
IV. SCHILLER’S HUMANISM: THE DOCTRINE OF A MODERN PROTAGORAS ... 76
1. Introduction 76
2. Schiller's Humanism J6
5 . Schiller's Contribution to Pragnatism 80
4. The Debate of Bradley and Schiller 86
The Thirteen Pragmatisms 83





2. Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism .... Ill
5 . The Philosophy of Fichte and its Relation to
Pragmatism II6
4. Schopenhauer’s Contact with Pragnatiem 119
The Flourishing Italian School 121
6. Pragmatism in France 124
7 . A German Criticism of Pragmatism 127
BIBLIOGRAPHY I5O
•+ I* • •
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to give an account of the development of
pragmatism from 1904 to 19 10. The primary source for study of the move-
ment during this period is the American and British philosophical jour-
nals; most of the material written during this period was first printed
in journals, and much of great importance is found only in the journals.
In addition to this primary source there are available several ex-
cellent studies of the thought of men influential in the movement, ge-
netic accounts written at a later date, and several studies of American
philosophy. These sources have been consulted in this thesis.
In this Introduction it seems advisable to give some account of the
philosophical journals of the period. As these journals were relatively
few in number, much important material was published in magazines not of
a strictly philosophical nature. This brief summary need not be con-
cerned with such magazines, albeit they provided an outlet for material
which otherwise might not have been published. Pragmatism did not have a
great influence on the continent and for this reason attention need not
be devoted to journals in non-English speaking countries, although occa-
sional reference is made to them in the body of the thesis.
The first philosophical journal published in the United States was
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy . It was founded in 186? and sus-
pended publication in 1895 • This journal stands as the fountainhead of
the idealistic movement in America. Through its pages European philoso-
phy was brought to America. William T. Harris was able "to make Hegel
talk English."
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2Here, however, it is only significant to note that in its pages
were published the early writings of men later to become influential in
the movement, men such as Peirce, Royce, James, and Dewey* It had, of
course, suspended publication before the pragmatic movement began#
Pre-eminently important in American philosophical thought was the
Philosophical Review, beginning publication in 1892# A prefatory note
in its initial volume sets forth its purpose# It said:
It will aim at the organization, the diffusion, and the in-
crease of philosophical knowledge in America# the scope
of the Review will be as wide as philosophy in its broadest
sense# ••• With the generality of its scope, the Review will
combine an impartiality and catholicity of tone and spirit#
It will not be the organ of any institutian, or of any sect,
or of any interest#
Consideration of the literature on pragmatism in its early years in
the Philosophical Review reveals that the promise of the foregoing aims
were on this case fulfilled# Articles for pragmatism and against prag-
matims appear# In general the Review tended to publish somewhat longer
articles than the other journals# These articles were largely histori-
cal, descriptive, and wider in scope than some of the more strictly po-
lemic articles appearing in other journals#
The Monist, founded in 1890 and ceasing publication in 195^, was
also a forum for discussions of pragmatism# It bears the imprint of one
man, Paul Cams, its editor during this period, more than do other jour-
nals# Here was published the work of Charles Peirce, at a time when very
litxle of his philosophical work was published elsewhere# Carus, what-
ever his other merits, recognized Peirce as a genius and saved saae of
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The Journal of Philosophy
,
or ae it was originally titled, The
Journal of Philosophy, Psychologyt and Scientific Method
,
commenced pub-
lication in 1904. Its aims, according to its opening number, were:
.... To stand for the unity of knowledge, aims to consider
the fundamental conceptions which bind together all the spe-
cialist results, seeks to enquire into the methods of science
which bring together the scientific workers, and into the
center of its sphere it puts philosophy.
As it was essentially a forum of quick discussion, the Journal of
Philosophy was perhaps the principal foruiD for the propagation of the
pragmatist doctrines. Many of the writings of Dev^ey and James were
first published in its pages. It was also the storm center for many of
the debates which characterized the movement in its early years. The
bibliography of articles on pragmatism appearing in the Journal of
Philoso:)hy is much longer than that from any other journal.
Mind
, a British journal, was also important in the pragmatist move-
ment. Although founded earlier, it came under new editorship, that of
a. F. Stout, in I892. In its first volume under this new editorship the
aims of the journal were set forth as follows:
We shall endeavor to imitate the catholicity and imparti-
ality which characterized the conduct of Mind under its
late genial and many-sided editor. Our ideal is to make it
an organ for the expression of all that is original and val-
uable in current English thought, without predilection for
any special school or any special department of philosophy or
psychology.
In its pages, Schiller, James, Bradley, and Taylor set forth their re-
spective doctrines. Schiller, the foremost English exponent of prag-
matism, published most of his early articles in Mind . Neo-Hegelian ab-
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at this tim© and with men such as Bradley, Taylor, and Hoernli as its ad-
versaries, pragmatism received some of its most telling criticisms in the
pages of this journal.
These journals wore the main organs for the publication of articles
influential in the development of the pragmatic movement. For the stu-
dent interested in the historical development of the movement, two other
sources are deserving of special mention. The first of these sources is
The Qollected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce . Peirce, although pub-
lishing comparatively little in his life-time, wrote a considerable
amount. Much of his thought, still in manuscript state, remained in the
Harvard University library for many years. The truly Herculean task of
editing it and preparing it for publication was finally undertaken by
Charles Hartshorn© and Paul Weiss. The magnitude of this task can be im-
derstood if it is remembered that Peirce himself doubted if he could sys-
tematize his work. The papers bearing on pragmatism, both previously
published and unpublished, throw valuable light, not only on obscure as-
pects of Peirce's version of pragmatism, but on the relation of Peirce to
James, Dewey, and Schiller.
The second source of inestimable value is Ralph Barton Perry's
The Thought and Character of V/illlam James
, a Pulitzer prize-v/ inning bi-
ography. This two-volume study contains many letters previously unpub-
lished, genetic accounts of various aspects of his thought, excellent
bibliographical references, and a critical interpretation of James's
thought. It is an invaluable reference work for the serious student
of James
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The first chapter of this thesis deals with pragrnatisiii as a revolt
against idealism and the thought of Charles S. Peirce. The development of
James’s pragmatism is the subject of the second chapter. John Dewey’s
instrumentalism is considered the third chapter. Chapter Four considers
the contribution to pragmatism of Schiller and an important critique of
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6Chapter I
THE BEGINNINGS OF PRAGMATISM
1
Idealism the reigning system
At the end of the nineteenth century American philosophy was predom-
inantly idealistic. Muelder and Sears remark, "Indeed to be a philoso-
ti 1pher of standing at the turn of the century was to be an idealist.
The story of idealism in America would lead far afield. It would
necessitate dealing with the influence of German thought in America, re-
counting the founding of the Jouraal of Speculative Philosophy , the
St. Louis School, and dealing separately with such original and creative
minds as Bowne, Creighton, Calkins, Howison, Ladd, Royce, Thilly,
Munsterberg, Palmer, and others.
There, of course, have been other tendencies in American thought.
The Scottish school of common sense realism was carried on by McCosh and
others at Princeton. There was the agnostic realism of Spencer and
Hamilton. The Thomistic realism of the Catholic sort existed, but its
influence on American thought was slight.
As has been noted, philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century
was predominantly idealistic. In its beginnings pragmatism was a revolt
against certain forms of this idealism. It is important to make the dis-
tinction among these, for it is only by distinguishing among the' forms of
idealism that we can understand the pragmatic revolt.
1. Muelder and Sears, DAP, 224.
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7As with many another philosophical concept, idealism has been the
subject of much controversy as to Its definition and its implications.
Brightraan ^ has clarified the issue by distinguishing four main histori-
cal types of idealism. This classification, although not the only one
possible, is advantageous for understanding the relation of pragmatism to
idealism. These four main types are as follows; the Platonic, the
Berkeleian,the Hegelian, and the Lotzean. Each of these agree on at
least one main proposition. The propositions that each of these have as-
serted are as follows. Platonic idealism asserts the objectivity of
value. Value, in its origin and meaning, is more than hvunan. Berkeleian
idealism asserts that the fundamental reality in the universe is mental
in nature. The key to reality is mind; this theory frequently has been
called mentalism, for there is no non-mental being. Hegelian idealism
asserts that reality is mental and organic, the whole has properties not
possessed by the parts. The Lotzean type asserts that reality is personal.
Self, or personality, is the fundamental reality of the universe. The
acceptance of one or more of these propositions makes a system or philoso-
phy idealistic in some degree. The adoption of such a classification,
althoiigh preventing easy labeling. of movements, goes far toward clarify-
ing the differences existing between movements, concepts, end systems.
,
Pragmatism, too, has meant different things to different men. To
distinguish what they felt either their distinctive contribution, or the
k essential import and meaning of pragmatism to be, they have adopted vari-
ous terms among which may be mentioned pragmaticism, radical empiricism.
2. Brightman, Art. (1955)*
1,‘si/jr.sfci ,j^e.anoo iacMqoeoI E.^q lerftcafl di.Lv/ bA.
.ancxiBoilqnx cix crt:& eilV-?- «». ^£.'I^vo•Iir:fJO rioLrc?- 40 ipdcdxKi
-neiCvtBid rfieai' -iSJC^ gti.Ldal;j!S£iXoSib sxjrtei ?>fii f.jad rx»iriid2.,i;‘iq
-5T.C yin.; e-ri f ±c/i d;:?A'cr'iIr, jrtO-iifiomfiaeXo , eidT . tcoxieeX^i lo .t«o
ci tra.ri«cqx/’-iq Ir noViaiST srit jiai;brtx*.ieT-/.^no 'xcl>©uo©sjptovi:xj, tx ^elo'XQBcq
?>d.t Odt :BWcno‘i; 8 B ctcb se<?Y.f‘nj;fcm ^uo‘i oeari'T'
J.
,te Kc et'x,ye eo-e li "io daa. .nBf-f.icJ ydi i^e reX-gd-ioa
-£ ’ ©YbH dondi “Ic i::Bt icrfi ?no;*ii<?oqc'r(] «d*T ..nciijleoqo'ic nrods sctc,
"
,«»•'/-
“id ^ixvxiOs?^do -^di citeeai? meiXet^ac ainoixlH .ewcXIo'i pb tin btii^a
nxi.£EX •d'lse ,n;3i.x/d n,cdi ?'xosi eX bfte nxgi'xo aXX ni ,b«XbV . C'SjXbv
ax ©stsvinix edi nX ifiinctcBbnx/*! ©di isdi sii'csac txsXIcpbl





KBiX^ebi r..3iXr*p,<^n .3crf.B<f .f airs e.—acts lo'i ,.flr?;lXjBicfftaf b?>rX so
iorf 8-^ Li’tBCf^q a.arf iS'Xorh/ sdJ joine^'sc biT.'\ Xain»a; el Xtidi Ri'ieoPe
. ff>rtORT:f;'q B-tyXil.e©! iadi atiedva od? e«ii yd besG^aaoq
erf* , ^.ei^v.iroy sdi ‘Ic Y'XXXeB" Xniftsijr'.Bbni,'^ «di fiX ,yiilB''toe'/Bq "£0 .qXrS
*
•^c.nriq 10 fi cfro.C:trBOCoriC ss^rji 'io »Yon ie sno. Ic er>fi«+c©rnr,
in( LvtBoL'lLanrJ: - ^ dowa 'to noiiqcbjs &dT &wa nX oX.XeifBf bX ydc
j
-
'itmXo b-ifivoi ixq ri.' ^xsiXcdBl yee® g/x Ltn;- ’rr^iq d^fiodilB
iff’
. 8CK^Je\« bn.6 .eiq^onoo. ,«Xftp-in»vci.i r.e<^wicd. jnxieixe ntoati-fl^z f.b wXi
•
('
oT ."®c irti-o't'iXb oi o^rxdi tc.fe'if-'l'i.lb s^d ,oci tCiiEXv effpiX^q
' t"'n
>kdi to ,noi twc'i'xJdC 0 avlXonxicib it^.j tediio iii'i y«di isdv daxuj^ni >aiX
-xtrv b«,tccbp ivxd t»|{i ,cd oi 'ic- i>riB XB-Lineoas








/ r“' ' '
'
V ,«paaiXaitS .S
8humaniBiD, immediate empiriciBm, instrumental ism, and even naturalism.
These diverse emphases will be dealt with in consideration of the vari-
ous leading figures in the pragmatic movement.
Pragmatists of all kinds, however, have one element in common,
which is an attitude of mind. ^ This attitude of mind is a faith in em-
piricism - although, of course, all empiricists are not pragmatists. It
is a logical development of, but not synonymous with, the British empiri-
cal tradition. In what is to follow the difference will be shown.
Pragmatism in its various forms is a protest in its beginnings
against Berkeleian idealism and Hegelian idealism. Against the former it
developed a new theory of truth; its objection to the latter was that it
led to what William James characterized as the ‘block universe, ' with no
room for contingency and individual freedom. To what extent these
charges are correct is a matter to be dealt with more fully in later
chapters.
2
The Pragmaticism of Peirce
a
Introduction
Charles Sanders Peirce is a philosopher the magnitude of whose work
is only now being recognized. Of him Bertrand Russell wrote:
Peirce was a man of tremendous energy, producing a multitude
of ideas, good, bad, and indifferent. He reminds one of a
5. Kallen finds this attitude of mind the touchstone of pragmatism.
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volcano, spouting vast maseoe of rock, some of whicH, on exami-
nation, turn out to be nuggets of pure gold* ^
The present thesis considers only one aspect of hie thought, his pragma-
tism, or, as he later came to term it, his pragmatic ism. The importance
of hie work in this connection is twofold: his influence on the thought
of hie lifelong friend V/illiam James, and his own published writings
which considerably affected the development of pragmatism.
Certain facts of his biography, aside from their intrinsic interest
shed light on his thought. Peirce was born in 1859 » the son of the dis-
tinguished mathematician Benjamin Peirce. Because of a certain wayward-
ness in his character and family life, coupled with a lack of interest
within academic walls for such an original and speculative mind, Peirce
never had a long academic career. He lectured on logic for a time at
Harvard and Johns Hopkins, gave mathematical instruction to business men
and worked for many years for the United States Coast and Geodetic
Survey. Throughout his life he experienced difficulty in getting his
work published. Another fact that deserves mention is the influence of
Peirce the scientist on Peirce the philosopher. He said of himself;
From the moment when I could think at all, until now, about
forty years, I have been diligently and incessantly occupied
with the study of the method of inquiry, both of those which
have been and are pursued and those which ought to be pur-
sued. For ten years ... I had been in training in the chemis-
try laboratory. I was thoroughly grounded ... in all that was
then known of physics and chemistry. ... I am saturated through
and through with the spirit of the physical sciences. 5
4. Feibleman, IPP, xvi
.
5 . Peirce, CP, 1.5* Following the practice of the editors, citations of
Peirce’s own writings will be by voliaae and paragraph. Thus, Peirce CP,
1.5. refers to Volume I», Paragraph 5 «
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A8 do many seminal minds, Peirce developed his own vocabulary. It
may be that this defeats its purpose of making his ideas clear, for the
student of Peirce is forced to learn a new vocabulary to grasp his mean-
ing. Although Peirce’s thought was never systematized in a single work
containing the essentials of his system, his individual papers are, on
the whole, models of clarity for the reader who observes his definitions.
The early history of pragmatism is bound up closely with the thought
of Peirce, As was mentioned in the foregoing, pragmatism has meant dif-
ferent things to different men. To express his meaning, Peirce chose the
word pragmaticism, concerning which more must be said. What Peirce
meant by pragmaticism was radically different from the conception held by
James, Dewey, or Schiller. Before dealing with his conceptions a brief
survey of the origin of the pragmatic idea and history of the term is de-
sirable .
b
The Origin of the Term
The idea, if not the name, of pragmatism Peirce felt to be old in
philosophy. Its affinities with the past are best given in Peirce’s own
words
;
Any philosophical doctrine that should be completely new could
hardly fail to prove completely false; but the rivulets at the
head of the river of pragmatism are easily traced back to al-
most any desired antiquity. Socrates bathed in these waters.
Aristotle rejoices when he can find them. They run, where
least one would suspect them, beneath the dry rubbish-heaps of
^
Spinoza. Those clean definitions that strew the pages of the
Essay concerning Humane Understanding (I refuse to reform the
spelling), had been washed out in these same pure springs. It
was this medi;im and not tar--v.'ater, that gave health and
strength to Berkeley's earlier works. ... From it the general
01
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viewe of Kant derive such clearness as they have. August
Comte made still more - much more - use of this element; as
much as he saw his way to using. °
Pragmatism, said Peirce, "is only an application of the sole principle of
logic which was recommended by Jesus: 'Ye may know them by their fruits i'
The term itself appears to have been used publicly for the first
time by V/illiam James., in his famous California address of I898
,
the rele^
vant portions of which are worth quoting. James writes that he heard
Peirce enunciate "the principle of practicalism - or pragmatism as he
called it" in Cambridge in the I870’s. Jataes credits Peirce with giving
his thought "the most likely direction in which to start up the trail of
truth," the direction being that "the effective meaning of any philo-
sophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular conse-
quence in our future practical experience ..." 9
In the 1870 's, to which James refers in the foregoing, James,
Peirce, Chauncey Wright, Oliver Wendell Holmes, F. S. Abbot, and others,
met frequently for discussion of philosophical and allied subjects.
This group called themselves the Metaphysical Club. They met over a pe-
riod of years and among the topics frequently discussed was Bain's defi-
nition of belief as "that upon which a man was prepered to act." As
Peirce says, from this definition of belief, "pragmatism is scarce more
6. Peirce, CP,
7 . Matthew: 7520,
8. Peirce, CP, 5.402, No. 2.
9* James, Art.(l904)l,
10. Cf. A. Bain, The Emotions and the Will , Ch. 11, 5^. ed., 1875*
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than a corollary."
The term itself, Peirce derived from Kant. He says:
Some of his friends wished him to call it practicism or prac-
ticalism. ... But for one who had learned philosophy out of
Kant ... and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily,
praktisch and pragiriatisch were as far apart as the two poles,
the former belonging in a region of thought v/here no mind of
the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground
under hie feet, the latter expressing relation to some defi-
nite human purpose. 15
Peirce, feeling the discussions carried on at the Metaphysical Club
not unworthy of preservation, wrote them up for publication in the
Popular Science Monthly of December 1877 » and January 1878 • It was
here that the doctrine, although not the term, saw print in perhaps its
most famous formulation.
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical
bearing, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then our conception of these effects is our sole conception of
the object.
It was this definition of pragmatism James quoted in his California ad-
dress of 1898 . The importance of this lies in the fact that not until
the publication of this address in 1904 under the title of "The Pragmatic
Method" did the philosophical world become aware that a new philosophy
11. Peirce, CP, 5*12.
12. Peirce, CP, 5.412.
15 . Obscurity is thrown on the origin of the term by a letter Peirce
wrote to James on November 10, I9OO, in which he said, "Who originated
the term 'pragmatism, ’ I or you? Where did it first appear in print?
What do you understand by it?" Cf. Perry, TCWJ, II, 407. It is clear,
however, that the idea that pragmatism originated with Peirce started
with James. For additional acknowledgments by James, Cf. Perry,
TCWJ, II, 408.
14. Peirce, CP, 5 .588-5 .4IO.
15 . Peirce, OP, 5*^02.
16 . James, Art.(1904)l.
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was arising, to be absorbed, accepted, or smitten into the limbo of un-
acceptable hypotheses. Peirce himself defined prsgmatism in a variety of
other ways, all consonant with one another.
After the publication of James's California address and the publi-
cation of Schiller's "Axioms as Postulates," Peirce concluded that his
views so differed from those of James and Schiller and also from the lit-
erary sense in which the term came to be used, it was necessary for him
I
to invent a more precise term for his doctrine. In his own words:
So then, the writer, finding his bantling 'pragmatism' so pro-
moted, feels that it is time to kiss his child good-by and re-
linquish it to its higher destiny; v.'hile to serve the precise
purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to an-
nounce the birth of the word 'pragmaticism, ' which is ugly
enough to be safe from kidnappers.
Perhaps the last ignominy Peirce's doctrine suffered was at the hands of
Papini concerning v.'hich Peirce said:
Professor Papini made the discovery that it cannot be defined -
a circumstance which, I believe, distinguishes it from all
other doctrines, of whatsoever natiJires they may be, that were
ever promulgated.
Peirce's choice of a new name, pragmaticism, for his doctrine was
not a mere bit of obstinacy on his part. Comparison of the views of
Peirce with those of James and the other pragmstists is better left for a
later section of the thesis. In this section, Peirce's pragmaticism will
be considered as philosophic method, in its relation to his logic, meta-
physics, doctrine of common-sense
,
and psychology.
17 • For seven other definitions see Feibleman, IPP,
IS, In Personal Idealism
,
ed. by H. Sturt, p.65(1902).
19* Peirce, CP,
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Pragmatism as Philosophic Method
Peirce never considered his pragmaticism a system of philosophy. It
is true that in his later thinking it assumed a central position, rather
than the peripheral position it occupied in his youth. Por him prag-
maticism was a philosophic method, albeit the only valid method of in-
quiry. Thus Peirce said, "Pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung , but is a
P 1
method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear."
Again:
The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and
pragmatism is that method of reflexion which is guided by con-
stantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the
ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and
uses of action or of thought.
d
Pragmatism and Logic
The reiteration of Peirce's contributions to logic are beyond the
province of this thesis. The relation of his pragmaticism to logic,
however, ought to be noted. Peirce considered himself a logician. It
is, therefore, natural that pragmaticism should be closely connected
with logic . In logic the distinction is customarily made between formal
and material logic, or the logic of deduction and of induction. The
truth of a syllogism, aside from formal consistency dealt with by formal
logic, is dependent on the truth of its premises. The premises, vintil
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hypotheses. Thus, it tests premises. Peirce calls this function of
pragmaticism "the logic of abduction." Thus Peirce refers to prag-
maticism as a "maxim of logic." In a letter to James, Peirce wrote,
"I ... think that the six lectures had better be confined to the single
subject of pragmatism, which as I understand it, is one of the proposi-
tions of logic." ^5 Again to James, "My philosophy and all philosophy
worthy of attention, reposes entirely upon the theory of logic."
e
Pragmatism and Metaphysics
One of the most crucial questions for a pragmatist is his attitude
toward metaphysics. Phrasing the matter in this way somewhat predicts
the view of some pragmatists, i.o., they are anti-metaphysical, or at
least doubtful of its possibility. It can, of course, be argued that
this constitutes a metaphysics. The point is only noted here as a con-
trast to Peirce whose system leaves room for, even demands, a meta-
physics. Space does not permit a complete exposition of the meta-
physics of Peirce; it is not necessary in any case, for only two aspects
of it are pertinent to his pragmaticism. They are his realism, leading
into his ontology, and his epistemology, more particularly his theory of
truth .
25 . Peirce, CP, 5 .2O6 . 25 . Perry, TOWJ, II, 427.
24. Peirce, CP, 5*19 » 26. Perry, TOWJ, II, 419.
27 . The only full length studies of Peirce vary here. Feibleman, IPP,
considers Peirce's metaphysics crucial but, excepting by himself,
untreated. Justus Buchler, CPE, considers Peirce from the view-
point of a logical positivist and disregards his metaphysics. The
space Peirce devotes in his writings to metaphysics is alone suf-
ficient argument against this position.
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The feature of hie pragmatic ism that most distinguishes it from
other pragmatist doctrines is "its strenuous insistence upon the truth
of scholastic realism." The question is the old one of nominalism
versus realism. Peirce defined nominalism as "the question of which is
the best, the laws or the facts under those laws," where the decision
is in favor of the facts. As Buchler indicates, ^0 Peirce nowhere gives
a clear and concise statement of his realism. He does say, however, hie
view is "well stated by the late Dr. Francis Tllingwood Abbot in the
introduction to his Scientific Theism ." In order to avoid the long
digression involved in collecting his pronouncements on realism, the
procedure adopted by Buchler, will be followed and Abbot quoted.
Abbot calls his realism "relationism ." Of it he says;
Carefully shuns the great error of scholastic realism, i.e.,
the hypostatization of universals as substances, entities, or
things; it teaches that genera and species exist objectively,
but only as relations, and that things and relatione con-
stitute two great, distinct orders of objective reality, in-
separable in existence yet distinguishable in thought.
In Peirce's view, nominslism won the day in the Middle Ages and as a
result modern thought has been overwhelmingly nominalistic, although
nominalism is false.
28, Peirce, CP,
29* Peirce, OP, 4.1,
50. Buchler, CPE, 125*
51. Abbot, ST, 28,
52. Buchler, CPE, 124.
55* Abbot, ST, 28. Abbot was a member of the Metaphysical Club men-
tioned in the foregoing and undoubtedly influenced Peirce considerably
in both his conversation and writing, Peirce called him "one of the
strongest thinkers I ever encountered," in a letter to James in 1904.
Of. Perry, TCWJ, II, 451*
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In short there was a tidal wave of nominalism, Descartes was
a nominalist. Locke and all his following, Berkeley, Hartley,
Hume, and even Reid, were nominalists. Leibniz was a nominal-
ist. ... Kant was a nominalist. ... Hegel was a nominalist of
realistic yearnings. ... Thus, in one word, all modern phi-
losophy has been nominalistic,
Modern philosophy, then, has been nominalistic, but Peirce, after
studies which had led him to the most obscure lairs of medieval dia-
lectic subtlety, was convinced of the truth of medieval realism as ex-
pounded by Duns Scotus, Although this realism is constantly reiterated
in his writings, perhaps its clearest exposition is in the rather ex-
tensive passage quoted below. He wrote as follows:
But it follows ths.t since no cognition of ours is absolutely
determinate, generals must have a real existence. Now this
scholastic realism is usually set down as a belief in meta-
physical fictions. But, in fact, a realist is simply one who
knows no more recondite reality than that which is represented
in a true representation. Since, therefore, the word 'man’ is
true of something, that which 'man' means is real. The nomi-
nalist must admit that man is truly applicable to something;
but he believes that there is beneath this thing in itself an
incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment. Mod-
ern nominalists are mostly superficial men who do not Icnow as
the more thorough Roscellinus and Occam did, that a reality
which has no representation is one which has no relation and
no quality. The greet argimnent for nominalism is that there
is no man unless there is some particular man. That, however,
does not affect the realism of Scotus-; for although there is
no man of whom all further determination can be denied; yet
there is a man, abstraction being made of all further deter-
mination, There is a real difference between man irrespective
of what the other determinations may be, and man with this or
that particular series of determinations, although undoubtedly
this difference is only relative to the mind and net in re .
Such is the position of Scotus. Occam 'a great objection is,
there can be no real distinction which is not in re
,
in the
thing-in-itself ; but this begs the question for it is itself
54. It is possible that Peirce here somewhat overstates the case, but
this was with him a lifelong opinion. Peirce, CP, I.I9.
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based only on the notion that reality is something independent




As was mentioned in the foregoing, pragnatism developed a new theory
of truth. It is, therefore, instructive in this regard at least to in-
dicate Peirce's view of truth. Although comparison and contrast of
Peirce and James will not be made in this portion of the thesis, it is to
be noted that it is at this point their viev/s are most divergent.
Peirce’s conception of truth follows logically from his realism and his
scientific training. His definition of truth is as follows:
Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determi-
nately singular subject, well-understood between all utterers
and interpreters; namely, to The Truth, which is the universe
of all universes, and is assumed on all hands to be real.
The truth is to be conceived as independent of opinion. Thus, "there is
something that is 30, no matter if there be an overwhelming vote against
it." Truth is the "conformity of things to their essential princi-
ples" and is eternal. It may be said in anticipation that James’s
view is that of a nominalistic psychologist whereas Peirce was a realist
in the scholastic sense, fighting always against the nominalist error.
55* Peirce, CP, 5*512. This is not Peirce’s only argument for realism.
For others, see Feibleman, IPP, 155^* quotation is illustrative in
several regards. It shows Peirce's metaphysical interest against the ab-
straction of his views presented by Buchler. Of. Buchler, CPE, x. It
also affords an interesting comparison with an idealistic conception of
universale. Brightman, ITP, 159» says "Universale then are real only in
and for particular minds." With this Peirce would concur but would not
consider mind as the key to reality or in any sense fundamental to nature.
56 . Peirce, CP, ^.^06 ,
57 . Peirce, CP, 2.155*
58 . Peirce, CP, 5*572.
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As will be shown in later sections of this thesis, James, Dewey,
Schiller, and other pragmatists, for varying reasons, regarded pragma-
tism as a philosophic consequent of a valid psychology. It will be in-
striiictive in this connection, therefore, to consider briefly Peirce's
view of the relation of pragmaticism to psychology. In a sense prag-
raaticism can be conceived as independent of psychology, for the rela-
tions of the hypotheses to the actual occurrences which exemplify them
have a non-mental being or existence. On the other hand, these rela-
tions are routed through the mind of experiencing individuals. The work-
ing of logical law on the minds of individuals, according to pragmatic
method, is the domain of psychology. Psychology, then, for Peirce has a
narrow application. He can say:
But how do we know that belief is nothing but the deliberate
preparedness to act according to the formula believed?
My original answer carried this back to psychological
principle. The conception of truth, according to me, was de-
veloped out of an original impulse to act consistently, to
have a definite intention. But in the first place, this was
not very clearly made out, and in the second place, I do not
thirJc it satisfactory to reduce such fundamental things or
facts to psychology. For man could alter his nature, or his
environment would alter it if he did not voluntarily do so,
if the impulse were not what was advantageous or fitting.
V/hy has evolution made man's mind to be so constructed? That
is the question we must nowadays ask, and all attempts to
ground the fiindamentals of logic on psychology are seen to be
essentially shallow, 59
A subsequent refinement of philosophic method Peirce developed from
his pragmaticism is the doctrine of critical common-sense. Hume's
59. Peirce, CP, 5.28.
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objections to the traditional method of obtaining certsinty in knowledge
led to two rival philosophies, the Scottish school of Reid, and Kant's
critical philosophy. Peirce attempts by his common-sens ism to achieve a
unity between these rival schools, deviating from both somewhat. He sums
his critical common-sensism up in six propositions. Full consideration
of this common-sensism would lead far afield. It would necessitate exami-
nation of both Kant and the Scottish school as well as comparison and
contrast with Peirce. This digression will not be undertaken since the
importance of common-sensism as a development of his pragmaticism does
not warrant it. Five of these propositions may be said, however, to op-
pose Reid's school. They are as follows: that there are indubitable
propositions and inferences, that indubitable propositions are inherent
in man from his beginning, that original beliefs are akin to instincts,
that which is thought to be indubitable before critical thought is in-
variably vague, and that genuine doubt is of extreme value. The common-
sensist, in contradistinction to Kant, "criticizes the critical method,
follows its footsteps, tracks it to its lair," Peirce's conception of
the relation of common-sensism to Kant can be seen in the following
%
quotation:
The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart
the proposition that the thing-in-itself can, however indi-
rectly, be conceived] and then correct the details of Kant's
doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become
a Critical Common-Sensist
.
Peirce developed various other doctrines among which may be mentioned
tychism, fallibilism, synechism, and agapism. These are only loosely con-
40. Peirce, GP, 5.525 4l. Peirce, CP, 5*^52
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nected with his pragmati ci sm and as they affected William James, although
iindergoing modification at his hands, and they will be discussed under James,
The lineaments of Peirce's pragmaticism have been shown in the fore-
going, In summary it may be said that its main features are as follows.
It is conceived by Peirce as a philosophic method, based upon logic, and
demanding scholastic realism, Peirce's emphasis is not psychological.
He conceived his doctrine as a modified Kantism and recognized a strong
Hegelian influence in his own thought.
IS
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THE PRAGMATISM OF JAMES
1
Introduction
V/illiaio James was born in 1842, the son of Henry James, a man note-
worthy in his own right in American letters. His brother, Henry James,
became one of America’s most distinguished novelists. The saga of the
James family is too well-known to be retold in this thesis. It is per-
haps sufficient to note that his illustrious father and brother, both of
whom were strong formative influences on V/illiam James, gave him a wider
circle even than he would have attained by the force of his own intellec-
tual vigor.
One of the most marked features of his personality was the open-
mindedness he displayed toward all ideas. Coiicerning this feature of his
personality Santayana says:
Philosophy for him had a Polish constitution; so long as a
single vote was cast against the majority, nothing could pass.
The suspense of judgment which he had imposed on himself as a
duty, became almost a necessity. I think it would have de-
pressed him if he had had to confess that any important, ques-
tion was finally settled. He would still have hoped that
something might turn up on the other side, and that just as
the scientific hangman was about to dispatch the poor con-
victed prisoner, an unexpected witness would ride up in hot
haste,, and prove him innocent. ^
Jame^s interest in psychical research and the wide range of sources from
which he drew material for his The Varieties of Religious Experience at-
test this feature of his personality.
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Although Buffering from ill health for most of his life, he wrote
many books, some containing the fruits of vast amounts of research. For
example, before dealing with the strictly paycholpgical material in his
The Principles of Psychology
,
he painstakingly reviewed ail the extant
metaphysical theories of mind, only to reject them.
During his life all the academic honors possible were heaped upon
him, and, although he cannot be said to have formed a school, his ideas
are still a potent force in psychology and philosophy. In philosophy the
doctrines of pragmatism and realism have, at least in large part, their
origin in James.
James's intellectual life falls naturally into three periods, corre-
sponding roughly to the two decades before the turn of the century and
the decade following. In the 1880's James was concerned with psychology.
It v;as during this period that The Principles of Psychology was written
and published. Interest in religion and ethics occupied the l890's re-
sulting in The Will to Believe in I896 and in the publication in 1902 of
his The Varieties of Religious Experience . The years from I9OO till his
death in I9IO at the age of 68 were devoted largely to philosophical
thinking. It is with this third period of his life that this thesis is
most concerned. Such a classification is at best arbitrary, for a mind
such as James’s could not be occupied for any long period of time with
but one interest.
Much that James wrote was designed for the public lecture hall. His
writings are, thus, for the most part, exceedingly concrete. They are
also easy to misinterpret as a result, and many of the polemical articles
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concerning his philosophy follow from the fact that he avoided the fine
technical distinctions which might have been made in writing designed
primarily for philosophical publication. James was at war with himself
constantly as to whether to write a systematic philosophy, or to lecture.
Although the systematic philosophy he planned was never completed, such
works as Essays in Radical Empiricism , The Meaning; of Truth , and Some
Problems of Philosophy were published largely in philosophical journals,
and were as rigorous as anything James could be expected to write.
His pragmatism must be seen in its context with the rest of his
metaphysics and the whole seen against the background of his psychology,
ethics, and philosophy of religion.
James studied medicine and in 1369 received the M.D. from Harvard
University. Ill health led him to Europe. After recuperation he studied
physiology, psychology, and philosophy in Europe, In 1878 he undertook
the treatise of psychology which was published in I89O, Concerning his
Psychology
,
Heidbreder has the following to say:
Though it was the most exhaustive treatise of general psy-
chology in its day, it is, at its best, a series of acute
perceptions and penetrating insights into a new and little
explored department of knowledge. ^
James's psychology profoundly influenced his philosophy. In the The
Principles of Psychology James developed a teleological view of mind. In
the last chapter of the Psychology, "Necessary Truths and the Effects of
Experience," he developed the thesis that there are innate predisposi-
tions that owe their continued existence, as do Darwinian variations, to
2. Heidbreder, SP, I6 I
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their function of adaption. Such a doctrine is a logical foundation for
James's emphasis on the emotional and practical side of man’s nature as
opposed to strictly theoretical considerations. Frequent references to
his psychology and that of others are made throughout his philosophical
writings. Although Sarwin and Bain are precursors or even founders of
what is known as psychomotor psychology, James also influenced it. This
psychomotor psychology stresses the influence of action on the mental
life of man. James's theory of emotions is an Lmportant contribution,
whatever assessment is made of its final validity, to this psychomotor
psychology, if only to focus attention on the problem. Full discussion
of this point is not relevant, but it is mentioned to point out that
•pragmatism, a doctrine stressing action and conduct, is in accord with a
psychomotor psychology. ^
James concern with ethics and religion did not end with the ten
years mentioned in the foregoing. Throughout his thinking he was con-
cerned with finding a place for the moral life of man, and with leaving
room for man's freedom. This was the essence of his pluralism - monism
led to a 'block universe' in which the individual was lost.
2
The Doctrine of Radical Empiricism
a
An Exposition
This section of the thesis deals with a metaphysical doctrine as
closely linked v/ith James's name as is his pragmatism. It is desirable
5. Cf
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to treat thie doctrine prior to consideration of hie pragmatism because
the import of pragmatism for James can best be understood in its relation
I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which I
give the name of radical empiricism^ and it seems to me that
the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step
of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail#^
James refers constantly, in hie defense of pragmatism in the philosophi-
cal journals, to radical empiricism. For example, in a footnote in an
important article, "The Esssence of Humanism, James refers to a state-
ment as "necessarily obscure to anyone who has not read my two articles
*Does Consciousness Exist' and 'A World of Pure Experience,
The doctrine of radical empiricism was largely formulated during
the years 1904 and 1905 in a series of articles in the Journal of
Q
Philosophy and elsewhere*® James felt that there was no necessary
connection between radical empiricism and pragmatism. Radical empiri-
cism he regarded as a separate doctrine. Thus he says:
Let me say that there is no logical connexion between prag-
matism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have re-
cently set forth as radical empiric! aa. The latter stands
on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be
a pragmatist,^
4, James, MT? xll,
^
8, The articles are collected in book form in James, ERE, Several ar-
ticles are from Mind and Psychological Review, The work was published
posthimiously, and, although it was known that James wished them pub-
lished in book form, the choice was made by its editor, Ralph Barton Perry,
9, James, PRA? ix.
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In James's philosophy the term empiricism ia used in two senses.
The first sense is an attitude of mind characteristic of his whole phi-
losophy. One statement of this empiricism is:
Empiricism on the contrary, lays explanatory stress upon the
part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a
collection and the universal as an abstraction.
The second sense of the term empiricism for James is as a specific meta-
physical doctrine. This section of the thesis relates the doctrine of
radical empiricism to his pragmatism. The relation of radical empiri-
cism to James ' R pragmatism is put in the following manner by Perry:
But the notion of pure experience was his deepest insight, his
most constructive idea, and his favorite solvent of the tradi-
tional philosophical difficulties. Pragmatism provided his
method or technique, and pluralism the architecture of the
finished product; but radical empiricism gave him his building
material.
According to James the doctrine of radical empiricism "consists
first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a
generalized conclusion." Of the first he says:
The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable
among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn
from experience. (Things of an unexperiencable nature may
exist ad libitum
,
but they form no part of the material for
philosophic debate.)
This postulate is the principle of pure experience. Of it, James says;
The principle of pure experience is also a methodological
postulate. Nothing shall be admitted as fact, it says,
10. James, Art.(1904)5»
11. Perry, TOWJ, II, 588 .
12. James's only summary statement of radical empiricism, according to
Perry, ERE, vii, is in the preface to MT. Perry, therefore, reprints it
in the preface to ERE. The exposition in this section follows this pref-
ace in ERE. The quotation above is from James, ERE, ix.
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execept what can be experienced at some definite time by some
experient; and for every feature of fact ever so experienced,
a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system
of reality* In other words* Everythiiig real must be experi-
enced somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must be
somewhere real*^^
James's definition of pragmatism in the California address and later in
several articles was as follows*
The meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to
some particular consequence in our future practical experience,
whether active or passive, the point lying rather in the fact
that the experience must be particular than in the fact that
it must be active*
It can be readily seen that pragmatism, on this definition, and pure
experience are perfectly consistent with one another*
Hhat, however, is more important is not the stat^ent of the postu-
late but its use* This leads to the second of the three components of
radical empiricism, the statement of fact* In James's words*
That the relations between things, conjunctive as well as dis-
junctive, are just as much matters of direct particular exper-
ience, neither more or less than the things themselves*
This theme of the relations of conjunction as well as disjunction is the
central them of the seties of articles written in 1904 and 1905* It
is James's distinctive contribution, whether true or false, to empiricism
and that which distingui sheds his empericism from that of Hume and Mill, and
the remainder of the British empirical school*
Now ordinary empiricism, in spite of the fact that conjunc-
tive and disjuBCtive relations present themselves as being
fully co-ordinate parte of experience, has always shown a
14 James, Art* (1904)^
15* James, Art* (1904)
16* James, BEE, x*
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tendency to do away with the connections of things, ajid to in-
sist on the disjunctions. Berkeley’s nominalism, Hume’s state-
ment that whatever things we distinguish are as ’loose and
separate’ as if they had ‘no manner of connection' «.• the
resolution of the causal tie into habit\ial sequence. ... are
examples of what I mean.
James by this empirical and relational version of activity seeks to es-
cape the baffling disjunctions of philosophy. Among other things, the
essays deal with the relation of cognition to its object; the role of
concepts and percepts; the problem of relations; the meaning of two
minds having the same object; the place of affectional facts in ex-
perience; ^ the mind-body problem; and the nature of truth.
The generalized conclusion has been implied in what has been said in
the foregoing:
The parts of experience hold together from next to next by re-
latione that are themselves parts of experience. The directly
apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trane-
empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a
concatenated or continuous structure. ^5
Radical empiricism is thus an epistemology and a metaphysics. Reality
for James is an "experience continuum."
The first of these articles bore the title "Does Consciousness
Exist?" It sets forth his fundamental doctrine of pure or neutral
experience. In his own words:
For twenty years I have mistrusted consciousness as^an entity;
... to give ... its pragmatic equivalent in realities of ex-
perience. ... To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists







25* James, Art. (1905)1.
24. James, Art. (1905)5*
25* James, ERE, xii*
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seeme so absurd on the face of it - for undeniably 'thoughts'
do exist - that I fear some readers will follow me no farther.
Let me then immediately explain that I moan only to deny that
the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically
that it does stand for a function. ... Whoever bolts out the
notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must
provide in some way for that function's being carried
It is worthwhile to stress the importance of these essays for both
the course of pragmatism and for realism as well. James's essay "Does
Consciousness Exist?" may well be considered the beginning of the real-
istic movement. Although the movement of the new realists was not
formulated until the spring of 1910, James's position rejected the
bifurcation of reality into mind and matter, and insisted that conscious
ness did not exist as an entity but as a function, a thesis the new real
ism maintained. Mind is a function of the organism responding to its en
vironment •
b
Fite’s Oriticiem of Radical Empiricism
One of the most searching criticisms of the doctrine of radical em-
piricism came from Professor Warner Fite in an article entitled "The
Experience Philosophy." Fite was of the opinion that James had not
really distinguished between pure experience and subjective experience.
Thus he wrote :
In the meantime, I may point out that whatever be the dis-
tinction betv/een experience and subjective experience, yet in
stlljg
on
26 . James, Art.(1904)2.
27 . James, Art. (1904)2.
28. Montague, Art. (1906).
29 . Fite, Art.
(
1906 ).
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practice, for both pragmatiet and subjective idealists, reali-
ty is always precisely co-extensive with the latter. 50
In James 'e reply to Fite, he states what he believes to be a realistic doctrine*
He says:
You seem to think that 'experience' means necessarily subjec-
tive experience* 'Pure ' experience for me antedates the dis-
tinction* It is my name for the ambiguous reality from which
wherever conceptually developed, the two dets of data come*
... If you take the world as 'experience' in the Subjective
sense, what is it the experience of? What is its 'content?
'
Nothing but real things, 'objective both in the epistemologi-
cal and in the physical sense. On the other hand, what is the
content of things? Nothing but sensation-stuff* ... The
pragmatist must be a natural realist, and believe in extra-
mental facts* 51
Perry points this out, as an explicit avowal of realism on James's part.
Some doubt, however could easily arise as to whether or no James's
sensation-stuff is other than Berkleian. J^pies had only recently been
converted from the idealist camp, and many of his readers were not aware
of his departure.
Fite felt, furthermore, that the notion of experience, or for that
matter any other category, as a pure datum, was a fallacy. Thus he wrote:
The experience philosopher builds the world upon experience*
But with the rest of us, he derives experience from the world.
For experience, whether the present experience or the series
of experiences, goes with the body; and the body goes with
other bodies. Experiences and things are tlms inseparably
connected. If you cast out the things, in order to derive them
from later experiences, you have in the same act cast out the
experience, and you 'solid' foiandation is in reality nothing
whatever* 55
Fite, Art. (1906)*
^1. Letter to Fite, April 1906, quoted in Perry, TCWJ,II, 591-592*
52. Perry, TC'.VJ, II, 588*
55* Fite, Art.(1906).
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In his reply to this objection of Fite, James does not face the issue as
squarely as formerly. The essential feature of his reply to this criti-
cism is as follows;
(Reality) is not an ’ultimate' in the sense in which you con-
demn. Its detenninations are all retrospective, drawn from
what it develops into; and in so far as the present develop-
ualistic as you represent ... it is
James’s doctrine of radical empiricism was attacked on another
score, in what James came to call the Miller-Bode objections. These ob-
jections coincided with doubts in the mind of James, and for a period of
two and a half years he kept a journal of his struggle with them. Bode ' s
objections were published in part in the philosophical journals in sever-
al articles. To understand the objection it is necessary to consider
James's psychological doctrines.
In one of the most famous chapters of his Psychology , James
treats of the stream of consciousness. Among other things his treatment
of the stream of consciousness stresses its uniqueness and indivisibility
The description bears resemblance to the Heraclitean doctrine of flux,
for every state of mind is so impregnated with its own context, as to be
incapable of repetition. This view is not self-contradictory, for at
this stage of his thought James had not renounced the duality of thought
54. Perry, TCWJ, II, 5p2 .
55 * Miller's objections did not appear in the Journals until I9II and
1912. They are also to be fovmd in part in Tssays Philosophical and
Psychological in Honor of William James, edited by James's associates.
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and object.. His view was still idealistic.
The doctrine of radical empiricism, however, renounced dualism, and
had only 'experiences.’ If experiences possessed the uniqueness of
thoughts, they lost their character of ccmraonness in a common external
world. This view is solipsism. On the other hand, if experiences pos-
sessed the character of commonness in a common external world, a view
maintained by most philosophers since Newton, how were they to be con-
ceived as entering into a uniquely individual conscious experience? Ex-
perience had to be conceived as retaining two sets of characteristics:
first, the immediate, unique, and transient life of the subject; and,
second, a commonness in a common external world. If all facts are facts-
of experience, how are the relations between personal streams of con-
sciousness to be conceived. This in essence comprised the Miller-Bode
objections. Thus Bode wrote:
We may now state the point at issue in the form of a dilemma.
Either a feeling of difference is everywhere the same, irres-
pective of the term's which it connects, and then it fails to
perform the function assigned to it, or every such feeling is
unique, and then such uniqueness can be accounted for only by
the presence of the terminus ad quern . ... If there were pure
'differences' (or pure 'ands^ and 'huts’ ) these states could
not develop by any logical or teleological continuity into a
final term possessing specific characteristics. ... If the
theory is to work, then, we must make appeal to the second al-
ternative. Every relational feeling must have a unique char-
acter from the start. ... The relational feeling of dii’fer-
ences can be realized if at all, only on condition that both
terms be present to consciousness. ... Whatever the nature of
reference ultimately turns out to be there is at present not
sufficient ground for the view that an adequate account of it
can ever be given in terms of immediate experience. 57
57 . Bode, Art. (1905)1
X
K
. X '2 c I Ili H; ' .'V 1x^2 - . «tf >(i&
oi;P ,^-irJ [ ^i.b r> crucT^i , oi'Uqx' Iv:.i;r^-T ''o :;f;:'i+;'«b
"Ic ca^c ^u'iinu i>C(Vi#*evoq errs t '. At i > ' y r’K- r ^•rf
j , .,, .',.p/..trc,, a nix gef no*.'. <- o 'io o
P'1
:> :tp(.r i ^.f7>;;n^^..^
. I '•pr 'i '. riir- ''’'t *^0 . r.r. 'li. I'C” 'r r
-:oo afjva'e.c 1- ;.:‘!3
-
. X "x'"
cv n tb f'lO-v I pm .;'iX’' ni'.V'MCO !
0 Sd oJ- V ? : * .*«•» o ' ' '••' r!
?‘-on .* /•; » rr-jC.t'v.JJ rOXi,b’‘'i.'
i J-p r r
• '•
C/^'i ~:do 'Ic. sdeo .«rj
1-r. 1- 4 . -r .
'
. Jd JlORPf P.
f
-
,v SO.: yr- :bf’X' fif*-; j_ -'H
0 d r ' ni"::- d'is XP b‘ v,:' r
c; ( 0 x.d fo': ot.r;r-i





-3d-o;i'x IS ' 'OP'*' '« nc;«' cr p nt r.' cn ,
-. cc *^0 p r virop'.ao i/ts’ )0'1 r^.ncbf : [e'c ' L' ros wcfl ,sr'"
>r5C|*s'':rt
fcoc r -'isl.:;: bsr.l






. 'C;;rclc.t p. %0 Pic': :.•: p:/Ep'i tr ,tc:x.
-
'.'I'-f;
'‘. j' S'l ri'^v.'yl':. /"
Cj prxi-4 norfvt i > :..‘r.sr;jT
t;d. :k-j' ','1-^VO- -lO ,, 'X
yd ylf'O ic'"': bo^'n/jc '.; on f.’O
'
'ijj •:. Z'lflrW :’.itci-'^
*?
r
Mixex trie to&-n+ Jx ’ .«1.' /.-.I'll.'.' Iinwt? rto )
‘ pi-covisl^ xr
V. cio. L ’" * rx'f' r<ic c .rr.ox^'clc.'f.'Ird *j'.' I«wX ,cJ- \c- “. ycls.'C-
.'f*r- C:-X -'- t; t oJpd'.' wc"-'. \yj €•''
xirrsiwx'; id "lo ;^ot. loti, i'- 'lor'di;b
,cH fio'..:\r ^ .y
,u 4 / " 1 C ov
bo-iy.-oop acbdojv.':
drtxr) --f.iJ (1'C.sr: 'i :ir . .. icu.




s’c: oi": cetc? y/r c ^ s on ;>o- . of'x 'i -'
l£ iincovvi .?• I iBiwr, wv..i-^ds c" c.i yi< :"'d
'Xxxlo rwo ?fU, fe sv :f{ j-vt‘;/ni Ixjnpx.hu o'l '.'I ’V .
x^^'x'Sx ,;. '5fo vffx.'' •.s'i f I d r 1
1
‘1 «xii- ••• .jx-jd"' tilst lCs. z-
rijed ffoldci'wo r.o yJho JIx: i- *11 i
•: :t.:o
C '"I ^ fMi S'-iJ" s d 1.
'
• . • • '•JiBft’r. i/Cx oon Ci - rrP .s ;
d-on ircf;piq J’p et sc od d^/o :.;-r;,. 5d vlod ; ;dl;'
'
j-i •lo 'fiijc c'0.0 nj- .'.irooib.n n.-- yiJdd w^i v orid '.-c'-- ; rd.'i,.-!;. ,tr •.v.co
r xi.t
Vc
. ftonc *0.1 f- tfei'taoi Ic er.i'i; il nwiy.. f ’ if 7v ;ipo
. 1 { :^o^.r ^ • c
/ v'r
The solution James required for the dilemma suggested in the fore-
going is to be able to say of a given conscious experience that it both
is and is not the same as another. The experience of one person must be
conceived as the same as another, or the result is solipsism. Subjec-
tively the experience is unique. Experience empirically taught this to
be true. Such a doctrine in James's mind ran counter to the logic of
identity. After ten years struggle with this problem, James was finally
constrained to say: "For my own part, I have finally found myself com-
pelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably."
Such a solution is close to Bergson's belief that life is deeper than
logic. In maintaining this position James was aided not a little by
Bergson's example.
The doctrine of panpsychism, asserting that each entity has an expe-
rience of its own, tempted James, but was a doctrine he never accepted.
The doctrine could provide a realistic interpretation of nature and yet
was not materialistic. It provided, in experiential terms, for regions
of thought and value falling outside the experience of man, a crucial
point of issue between idealism and realism. James corresponded with
both Santayana, who rejected panpsychism, and Strong, who developed a
panpsychistic theory, on the question of radical empiricism and its pos-
sible panpsychistic implications. As James's objections to panpsychism
were never published in the journals, extended consideration of hie ob-
jections to the view need not be attempted.
58. James, PU, 212.




'.a X ?/:' 'xr'i i's
r^/'cr*' Ljjclorn<o {rz\ i ^'
p
"Jo c ‘ 'Ic'c cc c .t ei
c j: Ui: ' Aft 'io oci £ .;; ££.tiX^; C-dX . . !dcn re :. d’ G end ic/cr fi
'
^ a. • <
~ rio •: Jog c -i: 4 f ; .it os: t'if u'dcirr, £ ; G.’flr sri .‘ .3 5 ;).‘'v ; f erv 0
cJ 3 Xxf j 4 N;\;: • r vl i.9 f iIxi '.iJ..^ I'i'. Cx'^ . 'U: u~i.' :'
’
GOfO.i’j exo OiXA ^ X V »,
''I ,cX .fix ieo'rxc,' : v -.frcin i. V ci'i’iX'juI-




- : bfti; ,r Xn b' lioCi
nr.lX- rI. -'?iX X 6.'nocT-x«.a 'oi -'=.clo r-.l ncx+ulctr .o'-jUt-J
f. tXXXXr ..on btfjl-o il ,!-'< iiciiieoq :i“ - oc^cX
. iXc .gi'Xt 3 'aC«t-;'5-'H
-:C':' it.r. r.*'f{ " ti.-'-rffr X'viX gr;jtf'£j^*n -i'-XoTGqrteq % Stix'i^oofc
- j> J-c; :..o>:' 'ic;v^r ori 'iX' ocb " r'.’ tfYv.o tii X.c t ra-. i
J-f\ jTt;' f“if;Xa! ^10 -...i TfttAqf'-.tid oi >’i.il ef'i p. w.xvct: blwoo oni.'?X':ob g'P'T
ic'i ;'3' i;-X X''i>-.i ' Ii^qxe n i‘ (bcti-Vi 'iq i’-I . ox i '. 0 '.'ifij
^ i:'! 'iC f f aiX' ob/.e.+.uo '^.ji.II’j'i oj;.'X''V J'i'X'r'iJo.'i'
JJ - ’ bH hoqab-^-jr o . -- cle.'-*: jfi.-3 .•.taXi^aeoi r(V.-''..tf d 'io if^Xcq
£ TOOf;cX ..e' :rX..' ,:;fi';tJI. Itfi- , y^eXdo oeins^e-/ c,h, ,.en 'Xfi.oicS died
-re .i>,XrjX e i: £ iffoil-a': .0 n r. i^.*3 6Up edd .x.; , voc j.rfX 0 L+q
. lficY'"dn*'’. c4' aiv'-i Xott!,<ifo aA . $iiC.!4f?ciX qiti cij4P’.i.i'c\r3'-i'p<; '?Icfj.3
- c s i.-' ''e tsc id.a7 -'Liaitr c beou' dxs ,eieAT;.fct f.d4 aX fcbAi®i Idifq 'iave>r: .t'li.i
,I}' tcfu9jwP td Ac-'fi bst.p ’rffti / • I'l oS fot r
.CIS ,’.H l .
, ,







The Doveloptnent of James’s Fragaatism
The cardinal principles of pragmatism for James are twofold: first,
the pragmatic method, and second, the pragmatic theory of truth. The
pragmatic method, in the sense that Peirce meant pragmatism, proposes to
interpret concepts in terms of their consequences for experience or prac-
tice. The pragmatic theory of truth, that truth is an attribute of ideas
rather than reality - the most original and controversial aspect of prag-
matism - is an original contribution of James. Truth, on this theory of
James, attaches to ideas in proportion as these ideas prove useful for
the purposes for which they are invoked. James's empiricism, with its
twin pillars of experientialism and experimentalism, thus broadly coin-
cides viith his pragmatism.
In 1893 James delivered his now famous California address,
"Philosophic Conceptions and Practical Results." This date is fre-
quently considered to be the beginning of the pragmatic movement. It
was after this address was published as "The Pragmatic Method," that
the debate in the philosophical journals began.
That there had been anticipations of pragmatism in various thinkers
iiPbefore this time is well known. It is, however, not so generally rec-
ognized that James had held pragmatic ideas for at least twenty years
previous to I898 and had formulated them in print on several occasions. ^5
40. For example. Perry, BWJ, 57 •
41. James, Art.(19C,4)l •
42. Some of these anticipations of pragmatism will be dealt with later.
45 . Bavcn, Art. ( 1955) • The treatment in this thesis of the development of
James's pragmatism prior to I898 follows Baum's analysis.
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James's frequent references of his indebtedness to Peirce (for ex-
ample in Pragmatism Peirce is called the originator of the pragmatic
method,) ^ may partially account for the belief that pragmatism as
method was formulated by Peirce, but was neglected until James's Cali-
fornia address. It is clear that James either overlooked or had for-
gotten the historical facts of the case. In 1881, seventeen years prior
to the California address, he cited and utilized Peirce's principle to
support his argument in an article "Reflex Action and Theism." In this
address he remarked:
Indeed it may be said that if two apparently different defi-
nitions of reality before us should have identical consequences,
those two definitions would really be identical definitions,
made delusively to appear different merely by the different
verbiage in which they are expressed.
In 1884, or fourteen years previous to the California address, in an
article entitled "On the Function of Cognition" James again quotes
from Peirce's article of 1673 as follows: "There is no distinction of
meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice." ^"7 This is used to reinforce his own contention that theo-
retical agreements and differences must be reducible to concrete percep-
tual agreements and differences.
44. James, PRA, 47*
45 . James, Art. (1881). In both the original article and as it was re-
printed in WB, James refers to Peirce's article of 1878, "How to Make
Our Ideas Clear," but quotes the title incorrectly in each citation,
substituting 'thoughts' for 'ideas.'
46. James, Art. (1884). James attached unique importance to this arti-
cle. In an important footnote he summarized the differences and addi-
tions in his later version of pragmatism. Attention will be given to
these differences in what follows.
47 . Peirce, Art. (1878).
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More important, however, for the purpose of ascertaining when
James's pragmatic ideas were clearly formulated is an article entitled
"Quolqucs Considerations sur la Methods Subjective." ^ In this essay,
finished on November 20, 1877 » James discusses the morality of the
universe. This date places it not only before Peirce’s article "How
to Make Our Ideas Clear," but before James’s earliest psychological
/
articles. The subject, of course, is central tc his thought. For the
positivist, James asserts, the question can have no meaning, for the in-
most meaning of the world is not a phenomenon, and is thus not verifiable
To this argument James replied:
que toute question a un sene et se posse nettement, de laquelle
results une claire alternative pratique, en telle sorte que,
selon qu'on y reponde, d’une maniere ou d 'xin autre, on doive
adopter une conduite ou une autre. ... On voit que le probleme
a un sens, puisqu'il comporte deux solutions contradictoires
dans la pratique de la vie .
Discussion of James's pragmatism prior to 1898 has so far been con-
cerned with pragmatism as a method. It is equally clear, however, that
even at this early stage in his thinking, James also conceived of prag-
matism as a theory of truth. In the form in which James finally worked
it out, pragmatism as a theory of truth involves two contentions: that
truth is a property of ideas rather than reality, and that truth becomes
attached to ideas in proportion to their usefulness for the purpose for
48. James, Art. ( 1873 )l
49 . James, CER, j6, "that a question has a meaning and is stated
plainly, when from it a clear practical alternative follows, in such a
way that, according as one replies one way or another, it is necessary to
adopt one course of conduct or another. ... It is seen that the problem
has a meaning because it involves two contradictory solutions in practical
life."
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which they are invoked. Although the theory, at this early stage, is not
\
consistently held or the possible attendant difficulties clearly con-
ceived, Jades held conceptions of pragmatism’s connection with truth.
Thus he wrote:
Mais comment un savant sait-il si son hypoth'se est la bonne?
II la prend pour bonne et it precede aux deductions, il agit
en consequence, de ce quil a pose. T^t ou tard les suites de
son activite le d^tromperont, si son poin de dtfpart a ^t^ pris
faussement. ... Le moyen est done le mer;e ici que dens les
sciences, de prouver qu’une opinion est fondee, et nous n’en
connaisons pas d’ autre. Observons seulment que, selons des
questions, le temps requis pour la verification varie . 50
Even more striking evidence of James’s concern with the nature of
truth, and the pragmatic solution of the problems thereof, is furnished
by an article of I878
,
"Spencer’s Definition of the Mind as Correspond-
ence." 5^ James in this article was concerned to develop an essentially
teleological view of mind, a central thought in his psychology, episte-
mology, and philosophy of religion. Truths are, in this article:
at best, postulates, each of which must depend on the gener-
al consensus of experience as a whole to bear out its validi-
ty. The formula which proves to have the most massive des-
tiny will be the true one. But this is a point which can be
solved ambulando
,
and not by any a priori definition. 5^
Clearly here truth does not reside in an antecedent reality to which an
idea must conform. Truth is rather a property of the idea or the
50 . James, CER, 73-79* "But how does the scientist know whether his hy-
pothesis is sound? He posits it as correct and precedes to the deduc-
tions, he acts on the consequences of tliat which he has posited. Sooner
or later the resul’<'a of his activity will inform him if he has proceeded
on a false assumption. ... The method is the same here as in the sciences,
for the proving that an opinion is well grounded and we know of no other.
Observe only the time required for verification varies."
51 . James, Art. (1878)2.
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activity which it initiates.
The secona characteristic of James’s fully developed theory of
truth was the contention that truth attaches to ideas in terms of their
usefulness for the purpose for which they were invoked. James, in a
rather unfortunate choice of terminology, called this the 'cash value of
an idea.' Concerning our several convictions and beliefs, all of which
are held to be true, James says:
Far from being vouched for by the past, these are verified
only by the future. They are all of them, in some sense,
laws of the ideal. They have to keep house together and
the weakest goes to the wall. ... While the issue is still
undecided, we can only call them our prepossessions. But
decided or not, 'go in' we each must for one set of inter-
ests or another. The question for each of us in the battle
of life is, 'Gan we come out with it?' ^2
The relation of such statements to his later pragmatism are clear enough
to require no comment.
From this evidence, it may be fairly stated that James’s pragmatism
was delineated in all its essential aspects even prior to the writing of
his psychology. That this pragmatism, particularly in its theory of
truth, had latent ambiguities is a matter to which consideration must be
given. The nature of some of the more important criticisms, most particu-
larly those directed at James's version of pragmatism, will serve to
show the nature of these ambiguities. One of the most important criti-
cisms of pragmatism in its early years was that of Love joy. 55 ^is in-
cisive criticisms, however, deal also v/ith Dewey and Schiller and had
beet be dealt with after exposition of their views.
^2. James, OER,
55* Love joy, Art. (1908)1
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The Defense of Pragmatism
The critics of James's vievf in its early years included such men as
Royce, Bradley, Taylor, Love joy, Bakev?ell, Creighton, Oarus, Lalande,
G. E. Moore, Perry, end Ladd. It cen be, thus, readily seen that
James’s view was rejected in part or in toto by such diverse schools as
the absolute idealism of Royce and Bradley, the objective idealism of
Creighton and others, the logical-scientific views of Carus, and by
such men as Moore and Ferry who accepted the realism of pragmatism. The
detailed examination of these views v/ould be overlong; largely they cen-
tered about James's conception of truth. James, whose primary interest
in pragmatism at this point was as a prolegomenon to radical empiricism,
found himself joined in the controversy over truth. The result was a
series of articles in the journals, collected together in hie book,
The Meaning of Truth . A fair sampling of the nature of this criticism
can perhaps be given in brief compass by the consideration of objections
such as Royce 's, another by Perry, and the general na.ture of the replies
James made. The articles by James in the journals during this period are
often repetitious. They are perhaps made so by the repeated misxmder-
standings of his view by critics both friendly and unfriendly. This at
least is James’s opinion. 55
In the great speculative mind of Josiah Royce, his friend and col-
league at Harvard, James found an intellectual adversary too dangerous to
be left in the rear while he advanced his own views, and yet one whose
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ideas he v/as ten years in the overcoming to his own satisfaction. 5^ A
typical presentation of his views is given in his now famous article
"The Sternal and the Practical." In this article there is the same
dialectic Royce had employed since his gradmte studies at Johns Hopkins
the possibility of truth or error depends on the existence of an infi-
nite judge, the Absolute. An idea is not true or false in itself, but
only to another idea, and this to a third ad infinitum . The perfection
of this argument, one which James could neither accept nor overthrow,
gave him ten years of perplexity before his final rejection of it. In
summation against pragmatism, Royce wrote:
pragmatism is right in asserting that every judgement, what-
ever else it may prove to be, is the expression of a present
activity, determined by a consciousness of need ... is a con-
structive response to a situation. ... we find that we need
the judgment to be more than this. This need is the peculiar
need that our judgment should be not only ours but true..
... That hie need for truth is the need that there should be
other points of view. ... These other points of view first
conceived as belonging to ourselves at other times, or to
other selves, those of our companions, ’'iie conceive that all
these points of view, so to agree as to confirm one another,
and so to unite in one system of truth act as to characterize
harmoniously the same object. ... That these various points
of view ... must be conceived as belonging to, and as being
included within, a single self, whose partial functions these
Various selves are, and whose common conscious purpose defines
the ought to which each of the various judgments is to con-
form. ... Mere magnitude and multiplicity cannot constitute
that aspect of consciousness which makes possible a genuine
ought. Accordingly ... in order to conceive our judgments
as true, we need to conceive them as partial functions of a
self which is so inclusive of all possible points of view
regarding our object ss to remain invariant in the presence
of all conceivable additional points of view, and so conscious
of its own finished end invariable purpose as to define an
56 . Royce and James on the Absolute are in Perry, TOWJ, II, 79*^”S10»
57* Royce, Art. ( 1904 ).
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ought that determines the truth or falsity of every possible
judgment sbout this object. ... If there is such an inclusive
and invariant self, it is of course complete at no moment of
time. ... Such a self is invariant and eternal, without there-
by ceasing at any and every point of time to be expressed in
finite and practical activities, such as appear in our own
judgments. ... The need for the Eternal is consequently one
of the deepest of all our practical needs. Herein lies at
once the justification of pragmatism, and logical impossi-
bility of pure pragmatism. Everything finite and temporal is
practical. All that is practice 1 borrows its truth from the
Eternal.
From James's point of view, the Absolute swallowed up pragmatism;
for Royce, the measure of truth in the doctrine was granted its place
within the Absolute.
James, although writing voluminously in the journals, never clearly
stated his reason for the rejection of the Absolute in these articles.
He refers frequently to his rejection of the doctrine, but the line of
argument is not stated. Perry expresses the reason for James's rejec-
tion of the Absolute in the following manneri
he came to see that an idea could be linked to its object by
relations falling altogether within the finite mind, its ob-
ject being that which it 'directly or indirectly operates on,
'
'actually or potentially terminates in.' 59
The Absolute, thus, became for James a supermmnerary, a needlessly pos-
tulated entity for the problem of knowledge.
In 1907 Ralph Barton Perry published an important and typical ar-
ticle, entitled "Reviev; of Pragmatism as a Philosophic Generalization.”
In this article he argued that the meaning and truth of ideas should be
58 . Royce, Art. (1904).
59 . Perry, TOWJ, II, 799*
60 . Perry, Art.(19C7).
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identified with their cognitive use in reference to experienced reality*
He was thus opposed to the anti-intellectualism of James* The reduction
of ideas to a merely,useful, ulterior practicality igonored the most im-
portant content of an idea, its cognitive use* Thus Perry wrote*
In so far as the pragpiatist contends that the proof of truth
consists essentially in the satisfaction of the cognitive
interest, his position is unequivocal and, as it appears to
me untenable, for in this proposition the relation of knowl-
edge to reality is explicitly subordinated to its relation
to the knower himself* But since we cannot leave reality wholly
out of the question, knowledge is thus made a mode not of the
reality known, but of the real knower*
He also stressed realism becais e of the difficulty of supposing that the
world is modified by the knowing of it* Thus he wrote*
In so far as pragmatism cleaves to subjectivism or relativism,
that is, insists that in knowledge the thing known is subord-
inated to the knower, it must abandon its empiricism for some
fom of transcendental idealism; since if the thing known is to
be reduced to the knower, the knower himself must be eredted
into a :eraanent and self-sub si stent entity capable of support-
ing the whole*
To the first of these contentions James replied*
You •** use the word practical as e*cluding intellectual prac-
tice* .** It may the tremendous theoretical use of telling
which concept is true, however; and that may remotely be
connected with practical usee over and above the mere verif-
ication or it may not*
In the case of the second criticism James wrote:
We pragmatists say that the constitution of the world of
naturalistic truth can itself only be understood by bring”
ing it into line with the appreciative truth* Subjective
needs play a part in both«°^
61* James, Letter, in Perry, TGWJ, II, 475-476
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In I9O8 James wrote an important article "The Pragmatist Account of
Truth and Its Misunderstandings." He hoped by this article to clear
up some of the more important misconceptions concerning the implications
of pragmatism. If negatively James could make clear whet pragmatism did
not mean, he felt that the doctrine could be examined positively on its
merits. In retrospect it can be seen that some of the objections James
discussed are of not intrinsic or historical importance. There is no
necessity to deal with them. Some of the objections, however, were
often repeated in the early years of pragmatism, and are current in the
literature today.
One of the most common misconceptions was that "pragmatism was
only a re-editing of positivism." Positivism was skepticism; it
maintained that real truth was unavailable. Pragmatism, it was felt by
James, at least at this juncture in his thinking, was able to "cover
the most complete truth that can be conceived of, absolute truth ... as
well as truth of the most relative and imperfect description."
Pragmatism was often conceived to be primarily an appeal to action.
In behalf of the critics, it must be said that James's references to
the 'cash value' of an idea, did easily lend itself to such an inter-
pretation. The original contribution in epistemological theory of prag-
matism, however, was not primarily an appeal to action; this was a sec-
ondary corollary. Pragmatism emphasized that in the function called





6k* James, MT, 185 .
65. James, MT, I85.
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Present ideals, also, as independent variables adding themselves to
being, may partly determine the existent, so that reality as a whole
is not definable without due consideration being given to present ideas,
and their consequences and implications. Thus, ideas, a complementel
factor of reality, lead to himian action; indeed action is a necessary
consequence of thought. There is no prior epistemological edifice; it
is a world in the making.
A pragmatist, claimed some of its critics, could not be a realist
in epistemology. As the truth of a belief consisted in giving satisfac-
tion, the conclusion was drawn that truth for the pragmatist fell wholly
within the subject, to be manufactured at his pleasure. Non-pragmatist
epistemology usually asserts that ideas must correspond or agree with
reality. For the pragmatist correspondence or agreement is vague; ideas
point to or lead towards reality, and the pointings and leadings, as a
result, give satisfaction. Thus James writes:
The concrete pointing and leading are conceived by the prag-
matist to be the work of other portions of the same universe
to which the reality and the mind belong, intermediary veri-
fying bits of experience with which the mind at one end, and
the reality at the other are joined.
James's pragmatism, as the foregoing has tried to show, developed
at an early date. There were considerable differences between the prag-
matism of the article "The Function of Cognition" and the volume bearing
the same name, and the pragmatism as it was held by James in 1909» the
year his book The Meaning of Truth was published. These differences
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largely consisted in greater explicitness and more care in definition in
the discussion of the nature of truth. This was brought about by the
storm of controversy that pragmatism aroused and the attendant defense of
the doctrine by James.
The early article recognized that the cognitive situation consisted
in the knowers idea, together with an external reality. Reality was in-
dependently given, a realistic assertion; and is known through inter-
mediate experience. It is pointed to through those intermediate expe-
riences, the pointing consisting in a resemblance and in action imping-
ing upon the reality thus pointed to. The epistemological gulf is elimi-
nated. By this elimination, the gulf of skepticism is avoided and an
Absolute made unnecessary. The whole truth relation falls inside con-
crete experience, a doctrine developing from James's radical empiricism.
The early account unduly stressed resemblance, and did not suffi-
ciently stress satisfactory adaption of an idea to its object. In other
words, James moved away from the orthodox theory of correspondence with
its structure, to a functional conception of knowledge and truth.
Twenty-five centuries of V/estern philosophy had produced tv;o theories of
truth, the correspondence theory of Aristotle and the scholastics, and
the coherence theory of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. The theory of corre-
spondence is the view of common-sense; the coherence theory is deductive.
James's pragmatism, whether true or false, has made its contribution by
developing an essentially inductive theory of truth. In dealing with
67 . These differences were summarized by James, himself, in an important
footnote in MT, 4l-42 . It is from this footnote the discussion to follow
is developed.
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Dewey, and to a leaser extent Schiller, the full implications of this
inductive theory of truth can be brought out. Although not completely
worked out by James, nor its full implications seen by him, this theory
had its origins in James. ^
In summary, it may be said that James’s pragmatism, both as method
and as theory of truth, was at least implicit in his thought as early as
1877 . Pragmatism, as philosophic method, would probably not have aroused
the debate attendant upon the controversy over truth. The series of ar-
ticles by James, ultimately embodied in the volume The Nature of Truth
,
are an attempt to make explicit a functional or pragmatic theory of truth.
68. Of. Savery, "The Significance of Dewey's l^hilosophy, " in Schillp,
PJD, 481-486.
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Whether one accepts John Dewey's philosophy or not, there is general
agreement that his influence on American life has been remarkable. Con-
trary to the popular opinion of the philosopher closeted in his study,
Dewey has championed liberal causes for near fifty years. Passionately
devoted to democracy, and seeing its salvation in the educational
process, it has been with education that his name has been most closely
linked in the mind of the public.
This thesis, however, is primarily concerned with the more technical
aspects of his philosophy* The chapter attempts to auznmsurize the formu-
lation of Dewey's pragmatism, or, as he prefers to call it, his instru-
mentalis, through the year 1910 as it was developed through the pages of
the philosophical journals* Naturally this will involve giving attention
to those philosophers who opposed him, for Dewey, as with other thinkers,
grew in stature as a result of defending and making explicit his beliefs*
Before coming to this main task of the chapter, it is desirable to give a
brief biographical sketch of Dewey, to make some general remarks on what
may be termed his conception of philosophy as it is found today in pre-
sumably its more or le.s final form, and to trace briefly the course of his
thought from idealism to instrumentalism* This transition from ideal-
ism to instrumentalism was largely accomplished prior to 1904, but
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nentalism still retains a measure of the idealism he first espoused*
2
A Biographical Sketch of Dewey^
John Dewey was born on October 20, 1859* In his biography there is
given a fairly complete account of the good, small New England town and
college* It is worthy of note that both his town and college were, demo-
cratic, individualistic, and intellectually free* T^ere is no reason
to assume that this did not influence him profoundly* In the best conno-
tation of the term, Dewey, may be called the philosopher of the common-man*
His graduate study was done at Johns Hopkins, from which institution
he received the Ph*D* in 1884* Here Dewey came under the influence of
George S* Morris and G* Stanley Hall* The former a logician, and the
latter, a psychologist, interested Dewey in two fields where he was later
to make some of his own best known contributions*
Dewey’s first teaching post was at the University of Michigan, where
his former teacher Morris became a colleague* At Michigan
,
Dewey also
became associated with James H* Tufts, Arthur H* Lloyd, and Geor e H.
Mead* Kis later a sociation with Tufts at Chicago bore fruit in the
Ethics published in 1908* Mead, although publishing little in his life-
2
time, influenced Dewey through conversations held over many years*
The years at Michigan, while still under the influence of Morris, were
1* This biographical information was drawn from "The Biography of John
Dewey* by his daughter, J^e Dewey, in Schilpp(ed* ), PJD, 5~45*
2* Jane Dewey claims that Mead's influence on John Dewey has been
underestimated* Jane Dewey in Schilpp (ed*), PJD| 25«
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the farthest beat of Dewey's wings in the air of idealism.
In 1894 he was called to the University of Chicago to head the de-
partment of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. Here, as well as with
Mead and Tufts, with whom he was associated at Michigan, Dev/ey had as a
colleague Addison W. Moore. An untimely death prevented Moore from hav-
ing what probably would have been a brilliant career. For Dewey, these
years at Chicago were fruitful. They resulted in the cooperative vol-
ume Studies in Logical Theory , and the founding of the educations lly
influential "Laboratory School." Also the vigorously pragmatist "Chicago
School" became famous in philosophy. Mainly because of increasing ad-
ministrative friction concerning the "Chicago Institute," a laboratory
training program in education, Dewey left the University of Chicago for
Columbia University.
Even to list the men with whom Dewey has been associated at Columbia
is too long a task. Among others, however, Montague, Love joy, Woodbridge
Ratner, and Hook are important. The major portion of Dewey's work was
not begun until after he came to Columbia. In contradistinction to
Peirce and James, Dewey, during the years covered in this thesis, was a
comparatively young man with his philosophical career before him.
5
Dewey's Conception of Philosophy
In his opening contribution to Studies in Logical Theory
,
Dewey
presented s conception of philosophy the full implications of which he
has been working out throughout his philosophical career. Although
Dewey has written volimainously, the problems he faces and the solutions
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he offers are implicit in this early work. ^ in Studies in Logical
Theory, philosophy is described as having three areas of study. These
areas may be represented in the fora of three concentric circles. The
innermost circle is occupied by reflective logic, or what Dewey calls
inquiry. In this field the magnum opus is Logic; A Theory of Inquiry
published in 1958. The second area represents the typical modes of
human experience including aesthetic, religious, and scientific realms.
Philosophic inquiry is here concerned with analyzing these modes of
experience and discovering their interrelations. The third circle in-
cludes the realm of cultural institutions; it generates that class of
problems commonly designated as social questions.
The core inquiry is thus logic; it is included within the other two
circles. These three areas must be conceived as interrelated; they are
functional distinctions within the inclusive field of experience. These
areas are not impermeable, fixed, or insulated one from the other. His
fundamental notion is of philosophic inquiry in a continuously inter-
connected field of experience.
With such a treatment Dewey is opposing views that treat philosophy
as composed of distinct bimdles of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics,
logic, et al. Philosophy on this latter conception degenerates into the
intellectual exercise of tying and untying the bundles. Problems are
5 . Dewey's essay in SLT is entitled "The Relationship of Thought and Its
Subject Matter." Ratner develops this schematization of Dewey's philoso-
phy in "Dewey's Conception of Philosophy" in Schillp (ed.), PJD, 49-75«
In hie contribution to PJD, Dewey concurs in the opinion that it is a
fair presentation of his total view. John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge,
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often removed from the context in which they occur and are intellectu-
alized. No one would deny the validity of the paradigm or intellecual
form of problems; but all too frequently the paradigm is substituted for
the actual context.
If, then, philosophies are to leave the study, and go into the
market-place and establish the continuous, functional connection between
inquiry and the various other activities of man the question of method
arises. What philosophic method will make this possible? This is,
of course, the age-old problem of how is the mind to know the world?
The connection for Dewey is, it does not have to be shown. Hie method
is empirical. Initially, however, there is a begging of the validity of
this empirical method. Specific, concrete, empirical problems are
treated. The technique works and its pragmatic implications are ob-
vious. At a minimxim, such a qxiestion-begging method has a quasi-logical
force. All that is required is the initial assumption of the method.
If valid, it will work, and Dewey, at least, feels that it does.
Some of Dewey's better known books natxurally group themselves as
logics of the various modes of experience: Human Nature and Conduct is a
psychology of ethics; A Common Faith is the method of inquiry applied to
religion; and Art as Experience is the logic of aesthetics. The very
classification of studies in such a fashion is apt to bring back the
conception of bundles, to revert to the earlier analogy. These modes of
experience are so interconnected that none is separable from the rest.
The common strands integrating the special logics into a comprehensive
logic of experience is attempted in Experience and Nature . It is
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Dewey's metaphysics* ^
General remarks such as the foregoing do little to express the
fertility of Dewey's thought* It must be remembered that during the
period covered by this thesis* Dewey was on the threshold of a long
philosophic career.
4
From Idealism to Instrumentalism
In 1879> the year Dewey graduated from the University of Vermont,
American philosophy was idealistic* The work of Peirce ^ and Chauncy
Wright, harbingers of things to come, was almost totally neglected* For
the first fifteen years of his philosophic career, Dewey was an ideal-
ist* By 1904 he had rejected idealism It is the purpose of this
section of the thesis to show how this came about* ^
In the early years of his philosophic career, the man who influ-
enced Dewey moat, first at Johns Hopkins and later at Michigan, was
George Sylvester Morris* Therefore, brief consideration of Morris's
position will make clear the nature of the early idealism of Dewey*
4* The contention that Dewey has no metaphysics can only be considered
as valid if a metaphysics is defined in terms of a certain kind of
metaphysics, i*e., as a transcendental metaphysics* Dewey attempts at
least to give a coherent account of reality, and that may be said to
constitute a metaphysics*
5* While Dewey was at Johns Hopkins, Peirce also was there* Although
Dewey later came to a position close to Peirce's, and expressed great
admiration for him, he apparently did not come under Peirce's influence
during his graduate studies*
6* Idealism, more particularly Hegelian, left its mark on Dewey's
thought* The extent of this, later sections of this thesis will show*
7* This account of Dewey's transition from idealism to pragmatism is in
large measure based on the account of White, GDI, passim.
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In terms of the history of philosophy, Morris was opposed to
British empiricism; he held to a doctrine of innate ideas. British em-
piricism treated mind in general as passive. Thus, of the theory of
innate ideas, Morris could write:
It implies that the mind has a nature and an activity pecul-
iar to itself, for the development of which exciting con-
ditions - be these sensible impressions of something else -
may be needed, but which are distinguished in reality, and
must be carefully kept distinct in theory from the condi-
tions as such. It implies that mind is not simply and char-
acteristically what it has
,
but what it does, not a state,
but an activity. 'Innate ideas* ... are the inherent, ra-
tional, independent fibres of the mind's own activity ...
and it is by no means necessary that they should become
visible, and be explicitly and universally and constantly
recognized as threads or states of consciousness ... in
order to prove their reality. °
Such an attack on passivity is the fons et origo of Dewey's lifelong
tilts against a spectator theory of knowledge. ^
Although more extended consideration of Morris's view would not be
relevant here, another aspect of his teachings deserve mention. Dewey
came to Hegel through Morris. From his study of Hegel, Morris came to
the opinion that experience was a living organic whole, and that the dis-
secting process of analytic empiricism rendered it lifeless. In typi-
cally Hegelian fashion, Morris distinguished two types of relation, me-
chanical and organic. Two things may be said to stand in mechanical or
external relation if there is not a third living thing between them, of
which they are both a part, or to which they both belong. On the other
hand, things may be said to stand in organic or inteimal relation, if
8. Morris, BTT, 195-196.
9 . Passivity, of course, has been often attacked by other idealists
such as Bowne.
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there is a third living thing of which they both are parts*
Throughout his life Dewey has characterized views as false which he
felt were dualistic* The early Dewey found dualism in many views hold-
ing to the mechanical relation between things*
In the 1380“ 8 and 1890's such a view as has been tentatively
sketched in the foregoing wee typical of the period* As Dewey became
occupied with the new psychology, Darwinian biology, and sociology, his
view underwent the change this section treats* It is important to re-
member that as a result of this early stage of his thought, before ho
came under the influence of these later doctrines, he had the philo-
sophic equipment with which to battle discontinuity, dualism, and
passivity*
Dewey, at the beginning of his philosophic career, was also under
the tutelage of G* Stanley Hall* Hall was the teacher of a whole genera-
tion of experimental psychologists, but there is no record that Dewey was
ever immersed in experimental work* Under Hall, however, Dewey learned
of the work of Wundt, who claimed that philosophy was nothing but psy-
chology* This psychological counterclaim against philosophy, and the
established idealistic belief that psychology was philosophy, forced
Dewey to think out the problem of the relation of philosophy and psy-
chology for himself* Involved were opinions of men, both of whom he re-
spected, which were contradictory* The results of his thought on the
10* The mere acceptance of the distinction between external and internal
relations does not classify a view as organic. It is a matter of degree,
the extent to which the universe is found to stand in internal relation-
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relation of psychology and philosophy were embodied in two papers of
1886 entitled "The Psychological Standpoint" and "Psychology as
Philosophic Method*"
Although detailed exposition of these articles would be overlong,
it is important to note that Dewey, at this stage in hie thought, em-
ployed the idealist universal consciousness as a principle of explana-
tion. Some of the implications and ramifications of this point deserve
mention. Many anti-idealists had urged that, since for idealism knowing
an object meant being conscious of the universal self, and this study of
consciousness was also the realm of psychology, there was no reason for
not merging psychology and philosophy. To preserve the autonomy of
philosophy, many idealists posed for philosophy the examination of the
universal consciousness, and for psychology the examination of the indi-
vidual consciousness.
Dewey, having studied the problem at greater length than most ideal-
ists, had perhaps a higher opinion of psychology than was generally cur-
rent among idealists. Therefore, he flatly rejected this distinction of
Caird. Thus, in the second article of 1886 he wrote:
No such distinction in the natiure of man as that in one as-
pect he is 'part of the partial world, ' and hence the sub-
ject of a purely natural science, psychology, and in another
the conscious subject for which all exists, the subject of
philosophy can be maintained.
11. Dewey, Art .(1886)1. 12. Dewey, Art .(1886)2.
15* This distinction between philosophy and psychology is clearly made,
for example, by Caird, Art. "Metaphysics" in Encyclopedia Brittanica
(ninth edition).
14. Dewey, Art.(1886)2.
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Dewey concludes that there ie a necessity for the universal self-
consciousness by a traditional idealistic dialectic* From the fact that
consciousness and its growth may be observed by others, he infers that a
imiversal consciousness must exist. He who would assert that conscious-
ness or knowledge is the product of the individual sensation, as Locke
and Berkeley maintained, is answered in the following manner:
Our objector has been supposing that he could account for the
origin of consciousness or knowledge because he could account
for the process by which the given knowledge of a given indi-
vidual came about. But if he accounts for this by something
which is not known ••• he is leaving the psychological stend-
point to take the ontological if he accounts for it by a
known something, as a sensation produced by the reaction of a
nervous organism upon a stimulus, he is accoxinting for its
origin from something which exists for and within Conscious-
ness. Consequently he is not accounting for the origin of
conecioueness or knowledge as such at all* He is simply ac-
counting for the origin of an individual consciousness, or a
specific group of known facts, by reference to the larger
group of known facte or universal consciousness* ^5
Human behavior is put on the par with non-hiaman things* If the
universal consciousness ie dropped, however, a thoroughly naturalistic
account of man can be attempted* The manner in which Dewey attempts
this is the next transition in hie thought to be considered*
15* Dewey, Art *(1884)1*
16* Prom the foregoing account one might infer that Dewey's transition
from idealism to pragmatism came about solely because of his belief in
the inadequacy of idealistic psychology. This impression, however,
would be erroneous* The transition in Dewey's thought might well be
shown through the change in his logical, or ethical views. Also the study
of scientific methodology was important in Dewey's development* Some con-
sideration of the logic he developed will be necessary in the next section*
Treatment of the ethics he developed would be too lengthy, and, in any ease,
probably the shift in his psychology is the most radical. It is a defen-
sible thesis that Dewey could have developed his early logical and ethical
views and remained within the fold of idealism. Consideration of his psy-
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In the years 1887 to 1889* Dewey wrote three books. Psychology in
1887, Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding in 1888,
and in 1889, the Applied Psychology with J. A. McClellan. In these
books Dewey's attachment to the idealistic elements in his early thought
remained unabated. In the year 1889 Dewey wrote in a review of T. H.
Green as follows:
These are the two fundamental positions of Green's con-
structive work: on one side an eternal self-consciousness,
as involved in the reality of experience; on the other,
human consciousness, a progressive reproduction of this
divine consciousness.
In 1890, however, Dewey delivered a devastating criticism of Green's po-
sition. It marks a profound break in Dewey's thinking; it presages a
rejection of Idealism, for Green had been one of his former idols. The
relevant passage is worth quotation. In this review he said that Green:
never ... quite freed himself from the negative element in
Kant - the idea that the regress from the world to self is
an abstract process, resulting in the notion of a spirit,
for which indeed reality exists, but of which nothing itself
may be said.
A quotation such as the foregoing is negative and destructive. The
problems met and answered by the old beliefs, however, remain. The posi-
tive reconstruction Dewey attempted is pragmatic, or more strictly func-
tional, and not idealistic. In his Psychology , Dewey had posited two
entities as principles of explanation: the universal mind, and the indi-
vidual ego. Two papers published in the Philosophical Review make com-
17* Dewey, Art. ( 1889 ).
18. Dewey, Art.(1890).
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plete hie break with idealism* In an article entitled "Self-Realization
as the Moral Ideal" Dewey dispenses with the notion of an individual
self partaking of a universal mind. He says:
The notion which I wish to criticize is that of the self as a
presupposed, fixed schema or outline, while realization con-
sists in filling up this schema* The notion which I would
suggest as substitute is that of the self as always a concrete
specific activity; and, therefore,
and realization.
of the identity of self
This in effect constitutes a rejection of the metaphysical conception of
the universal self-consciousness of idealism.
The conception of the individual ego Dewey postulated in hie
Psychology he now viewed as unessential. Thus, in an airticle "The Ego as
Cause " he rejects the ego as an efficient cause of volition. He writes:
When one man says to another, 'you did that and I shall hold
you responsible for it,* he means by his 'you* not a meta-
physical ego, but a definite individual - John Smith. Every
step away from concrete individ^ial, John Smith, .*• every
step toward an ego in general means a weakening of the con-
nection between the man and the act, and a release of the
man from the responsibility of the act.
In this article Dewey also makes substantially the same point about James
he makes in an important article of 19^0, "The Vanishing Subject in the
Psychology of James." James is unwilling to countenance ego in know-
ing, but sets it up in dealing with the will. There is no more neces-




22. Allport, commenting on this in‘^his article, "Dewey's Individual and
Social Psychology" remarks, "so whole-hearted in his conversion to the
functional position that Dewey accuses James of faint-heartedness."
Allport in Schillp, PJD, 268.
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dealing with the will than when dealing knowledge*
A.8 has been previously suggested, the influence of Darwinian biology
on the thought of Dewey was tremendous* The Dewey of today, as opposed
to the idealistic Dewey with which this section of this thesis has been
concerned, can be understood as following an adoption by Dewey of the in-
plications of Darwinian biology, as opposed to the Hegelian idealism he
had previously espoused* There are, of course, resemblances between
Hegel and Darwin which are more than superficial* Both recognize and
stress the importance of change and evolution in the nature of things*
In a sense, therefore, they stand on common ground as representitives of
a point of view unalterably opposed to the traditional conception of a
\miverse which is fixed, static, and immutable* The recognition of
these similirities, however, must not blind one to the differences which
are also tremendous*
Dewey's development can be understood only be recognizing these
differences* In the Hegelian idealism, from which the early Dewey
received his hurture, the universe was, in a sense, of necessity,
constituted by thought before any mind began to think* Such a con-
ception allowed for the universal mind as a psychological principle of
explanation* It showed how the mind came to be* The force of Darwin's
analysis was far different from this* Man, with hie distinctive capacity
2^* Hegelian interpretation is sometimes difficult, but in this case
it is fairly clear that Dewey misunderstood Hegel* Hegel would un-
doubtedly have held that the universe is constituted by thought before
any 'human mind' began to think* This incorrect interpretation, how-
ever is one placed upon Hegel by Dewey, and it is only with that
question that this thesis is concerned*
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of thought y was shown to be a product of certain natural forces of ad-
justment* Thought was not the unearthing of a pre-existent answer; it
was an active transformation of a situation* It introduced a new ele-
ment* Man achieved hie intelligence in the course of a struggle for
existence* Such a view logically leads to the specifically Deweyan
notion of conflict, concerning which more needs to be said at a later
point *
This adoption of Darwin over Hegel, in so far as their views are
incompatible, was not unconscious on the part of Dewey* To think out
its implications was to be one of his own distinctive contributions to
philosophy* An article on Darwin’s importance for philosophy was
given the leading place in a collection of Dewey's essays* in this
article, Dewey makes the point that the crisis aroused by the Darwinian
philosophy had more philosophic implications within the field of science
than as an issue between science and religion* The Darwinian conception
challenged the view held since Aristotle of a species or final cause as
the central principle of knowledge* His work was the logical culmination
of men such as Kepler, Copernicus, and Galileo* The measure of hie suc-
cess Darwin felt would be measured in terms of the success he would have
in convincing men of science such as Lyell in geology. Hooker in botany.
24* It is often overlooked that Dewey was not alone in this area of
thought* Recently attention has been given to the work of George H* Mead
in this connection* Also, Alfred Lloyd was attempting to construct what
he called "dynamic idealism" on the basis of what he felt to be the usable
elements in idealism* This matter is discussed in White, GDI, 109-125*
25* Dewey, Art*(1905)* The book was entitled The Influence of Darwin on
Philosophy * Here the most important of Dewey's early writings are col-
lected*
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and Huxley in zoology* Dewey writes of Darwin aa follows:
The influence of Darwin on philosophy resides in his having
conquered the principle of transition, and thereby freed
the new logic for application to mind and morals and life.
When he said of a species what Oalileo had said of the earth,
e pur se muove
,
he emancipated once for all, genetic and ex-
perimental ideas, as an^organon of asking questions and look-
ing for explanations. 26
The connection of this view with Dewey's view of thought as adjustment
are obvious.
This chronicle of Dewey's shift from idealism toward another view
is far from complete. In particular, there has been no consideration
of the important change in Dewey's views on logic. The next section,
dealing as it does with the development of Dewey's instnimentalism, can
deal with some of the more important aspects of this.
5
The Logical Basie of Instrumentalism
As has been shown in the foregoing, one of the strongest motiva-
tions for Dewey's rejection of idealism was dissatisfaction with the ade-
quacy of its psychology. Over a period of years, however, Dewey came to
feel that in the field of logic also, idealism was inadequate. It is the
purpose of this section to trace genetically how this came about and to
suggest Dewey's alternative solution.
In discussion of the development of Dewey's logical theory it is
well to begin with his wholesale rejection in 1891 of formal logic. He
26. Dewey, Art. (1909).
27* No attempt is made to assess either the historical priority or to
judge which was more important, logic or psychology, in developing
Dewey's instrumentalism. The two are inextricably bound up together.
They are separated in this thesis only for purposes of examination.
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had had a growing distrust of formal logic over a period of years, but
it was not until I89I that his break with it was complete* This does
not mean that Dewey analyzed formal logic and criticized it in detail*
It was Dewey's feeling that the technical subject matter of formal logic
was no longer ta’^en seriously by anybody. His chief criticism, however,
was leveled at the conception of thought which was at the bottom of for-
mal logic. Thus, in an article "The Present Position of Logical Theory,"
Dewey could write that for the formal logician thought:
is a faculty or an entity existing in the mind apart from the
facts, and ... it has its own fixed forms, with which facts
have nothing to do except in so far as they pass under the
yoke •
Such a sterile conception was anathema to the young Dewey; he saw in
formal logic another dualism* In the same article of 1691 he summarized
the state of logical theory as follows:
It is that any attempt to state in general, or to work out
in detail, the principle of the intrinsic and fruitful re-
lation of fact and thought which science, without conscious
reflection, constantly employs in practice, seems metaphysi-
cal or even absurd* Why is this?
Dewey answers this question himself in the following manner:
The chief cause is that superstition which still holds en-
thralled so much of modern thought - I mean formal logic*
And if this seems like applying to what, at best. and at
worst, is only an intellectual gymnastic, I can only say
that formal logic seems to me to be, at present, fons et
origo malorum in philosophy* ^9
Such thoughts on the value of formal logic were not the particular
property of Dewey at this time* Idealism in general, and Dewey was at
28* These anticipations of a break with formal logic in the thought of
Dewey are discussed in detail in White, GDI, 64-95*
29* Dewey, Art*(l89l)*
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thie time still an idealistt distrusted formal logic* For it they substi-
tuted a transcendental logic, a logic which had achieved its highest ex-
pression in Hegel.
Such a transcendental logic was not mutually exclusive of an em-
pirical logic. They were partners but with one crucial difference. Tran-
scendental logic had dispensed with the scholastic idea of thought* Thie
distinction needs more complete exposition. Formal logicians of the
nineteenth century, men such as Jevons, Mill, and Venn, had come to the
realization that deductive logic could not deal with an empirical account
of thought as carried on by the scientists. A new logic was needed, a
logic of induction. They developed this logic. Dewey opposed this logic,
however, as being formalist. He thus writes:
Thought being confined to the rigid framework in which the
material being manipulated often being obtained, is ex-
cluded from all share in the gathering of material* The
result is that the material, having no thought-side,
shrinks into a more or less accidental association of more
or lees shifting and transitory states. ^0
Dewey was well aware that the transcendental movement was usually con-
ceived as the foe of science and inductive logic as specifically scien-
tific. This conception rested, in Dewey's mind, on an historical error.
Philosophers had not gone on from Kant to Hegel. Kant's analysis of
knowledge leads him to conclude that there are two separate factors, the
a priori and that the a posteriori . Speaking of thie Kantian distinc-
tion in knowledge, Dewey writes:
Neither is knowledge in itself. What more natural than to
put them together, and hold that knowledge is the union of
50 . Dewey, Art.(189l)
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a matter or stuff of sensations atomic in themselves, on one
hand, and a form, or regulating principle of thought, empty
in itself, on the other. We have two elements, both exist-
ing in isolation, end yet both useless for all purposes of
knowledge. Combine them, and there is science.
Hegel, however, conceived of reality as a connected system. He repre*
sents the "quintessence of the scientific spirit."
In Dewey's logical writings, the paper of I89I is his last groat
defense of Hegel. 52 Between I89I and I9OO Dewey wrote little on logic.
In 1900 there appeared an article entitled "Some Stages of Logical
Thought" which rings the death knell on not only formal and inductive
logic, but transcendental logic as well. Although Dewey was teaching
logic during these years, using the texts of Mill, Lotze, Bosanquet, and
Bradley, the dearth of logical papers in this period may well Indicate
that his change of opinion came about as a result of work largely in
ethics and psychology. In 1905 the famous Studies in Logical Theory
were produced. Here was the first full-scale inetrvunentalist program by
Dewey. It is to this that attention must next be given.
The Studies are among the most difficult of Dewey's writings. They
are also among his most important works. They represent, as William
James said, "a new school of thought." The movement into Dewey's pages
in the Studies is to leave idealism. There are, of course, idealistic
elements left, but the air breathed is a new one. The Dewey of I905 is
51 * Dewey, Art.( 189l).
52. The extent to which Hegelian thought can be found in Dewey's writ-
ing throughout hie philosophical career is difficult to assess. Dewey
himself says, "I should never think of ignoring, much less denying, what
an astute critic occasionally refers to as a novel discovery - that ac-
quaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking."
Dewey, Art. in CAP.
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obviously not the Dewey of the Logic of 1958# but they are logically
connected. The Dewey of 195® has worked out the implications of the
position taken in 1905 •
Before consideration is given to the positive views Dewey ex-
presses in the Studies
,
it may be well to consider one important nega-
tive consideration - his argument against idealism. He first reaffirms
organicism, a faith maintained throughout hie career. The dualisms
Dewey has found are different at different times, but he remains adamant
in his fight against them, wherever they be found. His new view and the
idealist view, he says:
Part company when a fundamental question is raised. Is all
organized meaning the work of thought? Does it therefore
follow that the organization out of which reflective thought
grows is the work of thought of some other type - of Pure
Thought, Creative or Constitutive Thought, Intuitive Reason?
”
Two reasons are given by Dewey for hie divergence from idealism. First
of all, he says;
The more one insists that the antecedent situation is con-
stituted by thought, the more one has to wonder why another
type of thought is required} what need arouses it, and how
it is possible for it to improve upon the work of previous
constitutive thought. ... How does it happen that the ab-
solute constitutive and intuitive thought does such a poor
and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive ac-
tivity to patch up its product.
The second objection that Dewey raises against idealism is as follows:
How can thought relate itself to the fragmentary sensations,
impressions, feelings, which in their contrast with and dis-
parity from the workings of constitutive thought, mark it
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Dewey pleads for a view that eenaatlon, perception, judgment, and infer-
ence, - "all these distinctions come within the thought situation as
growing out a characteristic antecedent typical formation of experience."
They are phases of a total process, linked and forever passing into each
other. If these two orders, perception and thought, are set up, it becomes
impossible to see how they can unite in the solution of specific problems.
Thought, in the first essay, "comes after something, and out of some-
thing, and for the sake of something." 57 Such an affirmation might seem
trivial, even if true, if it is not remembered that Dewey is opposed to
those who believe in thought as constitutive. Thought for Dewey is deriva-
tive and secondary, arising from need.
Another important thesis presented in the Studies is the conception
of logic “as the natural history of thou^t." These essays are written in
the form of a criticism of the logical theory of Lotze; it is only neces-
sary to discuss him in so far as his position was opposed to this thesis
of logic as the natural history of thought. Lotze had maintained that it
was necessary to distinguish between the psychological origin of knowl-
edge, with which, of course, the psychologist dealt, and the evaluation of
it, with which the logician dealt. 58 The task of the logician, in
Dewey's opinion, was to follow:
the natural history of thinking as a life-process having its
own generating antecedents and stimuli, its own states and
career, and its own specific objective or limit.
56 . Dewey, EEL, 15^. 57* Dewey, EEL, I50 .
58 . It will be noted that this distinction between the psychological
origin of knowledge, and the logical evaluation is common today.
59 * Dewey, EEL, 91“92.
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Those who refused to recognize this are assigned to the limboj of
dualists*
With this opposition to a view of thought as constitutive, Dewey had
to fashion a new logic. Aristotelian logic, as has been shown, was an
anathema to him* Eliminated, also, for him was the logic of Mill and his
followers* About mathematical logic he apparently knew nothing and cared
less. His only firm conviction was that thought was a doubt-inquiry
process* The closing question of "Some Stages of Logical Thought" imply
a promise which Dewey tried to fulfill in 195® with Logic: A Theory of
Inquiry * Thus, in 1900, he wrote;
Does not an account of thinking, basing itself on modern
scientific procedure, demand a statement in which all the
distinctions and terms of thought - judgment, concept,
inference, predicate, and copula of judgment - shall be in-
terpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or
divisions of labor within the doubt-inquiry process*
6
Dewey's Contribution to Pragmatism
The Studies in Logical Theory were a publication of what came to be
known as the "Chicago School*" The acknowledged leader of this school was
Dewey* Such a claeeification implies that the men involved had made a
distinctive contribution, possibly connected with, but in some sense origi-
nal and different from, other pragmatist doctrines. It is the purpose of
this section of the thesis to delineate in its essential aspects the na-
ture of this contribution*
In an article appearing in the Revue de Metaphysigue et de Morale ,
Dewey offers the following definition;
40* Dewey, EEL, 219
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Instrumental! Bin is an attempt to constitute a precise logi-
cal theory of concepts, of judgments, and inferences in
their various forms, by considering primarily how thought
fuctions in the experimental determinations of future con-
sequences. ••• it attempts to establish imiversally recog-
nized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them
frcwn the reconstructive or mediative function ascribed to
reason. It alms to constitute a theory of the general forms
of conception and reasoning and not of this or that particu-
lar judgnent or concept related to its own content, or to
its particular implication.
In the same article Dewey discusses the historical antecedents of
instrumentalism. One of the most important of these historical ante-
cedents is the criterion of truth as verifiability. This has been dealt
with to some extent in this thesis in the previous chapter on James.
Dewey's views on the matter will bo reserved for future consideration.
Above and beyond this, however, there are two factors of particular im-
portance in the historical antecedents to instrumentalism. The first
of these is psychological; the second is a critique of epistemology and
of logic. What has been said in previous sections of this chapter can
now be tied in meaningfully with the nature of Dewey's instrumentalist
theories.
The psychological tendencies that have exerted an influence on
instrumentalism are of a biological rather than a physiological nature.
First of all, they are closely related to that school of psychology
known as behaviorism. Dewey defines the point of departure for his
theory as follows:
... the conception of the brain as an organ for the co-
ordination of sense stimuli (to which one should add
4l. Dewey, Art .(1922). Reprinted and translated in the arti’cle “The
Development of American Pragmatism" by John Dewey, in SHI, II, 567 .
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modifioations cauead by habit, unconecioua memory and what
are called today 'conditioned reflexes') for the purpose of
effecting motor responses.
It is maintained, on the basis of the theory of organic evolution, that
intelligence is compatible with the known order of biological facts.
These biological facts seem to demonstrate that the central nervous sys-
tem occupies an intermediate position between the environment and the
needs of the organism.
Secondly, in psychology the instrumentalists find their source in
James. However, their source ini James ii not his later writings
but his Psychology . Two theses of James's psychology are, for the
instrumentalist view, important. The first is James's conception of the
stream of consciousness. Such a conception "necessitates a considera-
tion of relations as an immediate part of the field of consciousness,
having the same status as qualities." ^ In hie Psychology
.
James es-
tablished the criterion of mind as "the pursuance of ends and the choice
of means for their attainment." Man is a "fighter for ends." The
instrumentalists accept and work out this teleological conception of
mind.
With the psychological and biological theories just enumerated, and
an interest in logical theory of conception and judgment, the instru-
mentalist develops a theory Dewey describes as follows;
The adaptions made by inferior organisms, for example their
effective and co-ordinated responses to stimuli, become
42. Dewey, Art. in SHI, 5^8.
45 . The Studies of the Chicago School is dedicated to James.
44. James, PSY, Ch. 4.
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teleological in man and therefore give occasion to thought*
Reflection is an indirect response to the environment, and
the element of indirection can itself become great and very
complicated. But it has its origin in biological adaptive
behavior and its ultimate function in its cognitive aspect
is a prospective control of the conditions of its environ-
ment. The function of intelligence is therefore not that
of copying objects of the envirorment, but rather taking
account of the way in which more effective and more profita-
ble relations with those objects may be established* ^
Dewey's circuitous road to the realization of the necessity of an
instrumentalist logic has already been treated. To attempt to treat the
instrumentalist conception of a theory of judgment would be of necessity
over-long. One quotation will suffice to explain the general nature of
the position. Dewey says:
The subject of a judgment represents that portion of the en-
vironment to which a reaction must be made; the attribute
represents the corresponding response or the habit or the
manner in which one must behave towards the environment;
the copula represents the organic and concrete act by which
the connection is made between the facts and its significa-
tion; and finally the conclusion, or the definitive object
of judgments, is simply the same situation transformed, a
situation which implies a change as well in the original
subject (including its mind) as in the environment itself.
On this conception, it can be readily seen that instrumentalist logic
leads to a realistic metaphysics. There is, in a sense, also an
idealistic metaphysics in so far as instrumentalist logic “contenda
that thought gives birth to distinctive acts which modify future facts
and events in such a way as to render them more reasonable, that is to
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It is to b« feared, however, that this would give but scant comfort to
most idealists if they felt that their case rested solely on this evi-
dence .
To turn now from Dewey's more typically instrumentalist bias to his
more general contribution to pragmatism, he has added or stressed several
notions of importance to the movement* In the history of pragmatism one
of the most far-reaching and important developments has been the notion
of an experimental theory of knowledge* Truth, on this conception, is
verifiability* Verification is the fulfillment of a prediction brought
about by an operation of the mind* Dewey has, of all pragmatists, made
the most use of this notion*
The historical context of the development of the notion shows the
importance of James on Dewey at this point* From the time of Plato's
Theaetetus
,
the problem of objective reference had been a knotty one
for philosophers* Much of the vast amount of epistemological specula-
tion in the history of V/estern philosophy has been on just this problem*
Put in its most fundamental form, the question is, to what does an idea
refer, or what is the meaning of an idea? James gave as an example of
objective reference the future of the stream of experience* The
principle thesis is that meaning is functional; an experience means what
it refers or leads to* It is a genuine reference beyond, giving "the
feeling of tendencies," the "sense of more to come*" 5^
49* James, Art *(1885) James, Art *(1895)*
50* It is not relevant here to trace the growth of this theory from
James PRA to the articles cited* The theory could also be compared to
the functional theory of Dickinson Miller* Of* Savery, Art* "Significance
of Dewey's Philosophy" in Schtlpp (ed*), PJD, 492*
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James was primarily interested in knowing and did not develop the notion
of the meaning of an idea more than to say "to know an object ie here to
lead to it through a context which the world supplies*" 51
James's theory of objective reference to the future of the stream of
experience* Dewey accepted* To it* he added another notion* namely* that
the meaning of an idea always contains a plan of action* 52
In the Studies of I905 Dewey said that the test of the validity of
an idea "is to its functional or experimental use in effecting the tran-
sition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated
one*" 55 By I9O6 Dewey was writing of an "Experimental Theory of Knowl-
edge*" 5^ In this important paper* an experience ie knowledge:
if in its quale there is an experienced distinction of two
elements of the following sort: one means or intends the
presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself
is already present* while the other is that which* while
not present in the same fashion* must become so present if
the meaning or intuition of its companion or yoke-fellow
ie to be fulfilled through the operation it sets up* 55
Again* in 190?* Dewey writes;
Vie call it verification when we regard it as a process; when
the development of the idea is strung out and exposed to
view in all that makes it true* *•• an idea is made true;
that which was a proposal or hypothesis is no longer merely
a propounding or guess* If I had not reacted in a way ap-
propriate to the idea it would have remained a mere idea;
at most a candidate for truth* 5®
51 * James* Art *(1895)*
52 * This notion of ideas as plans of actions* although foreshadowed in
James, was propagated by Dewey* It is to be found throughout his writings
55* Dewey* EEL, I70 .
54 . Dewey* Art *(1906)* Reprinted in IDP.
55* Dewey* IDP, 90*
56 * Dewey, Art *(1907)* Reprinted in IDP* 140-141.
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Ab the foregoing quotations show^ truth is verification* Verification
involves a prediction brought to realization by the operation of a
mind*
To James the differences in the versions of his own pragmatism and
that of Peirce, Dewey, and Schiller, were not great. He admitted the
differences, but felt that these differences were more of emphasis than
of fundamental divergence. Dewey, like Peirce in this respect, was more
anxious to make hie position clear and thus to state his differences. 57
In James's Pragmati sm there were two theories of truth in juxtapo-
sition. One of these theories of truth, close to Dewey's verification,
has been dealt with in this and the previous chapter. The other theory,
that truth consists in any useful conseqiience not only of an idea but
also of a belief, is connected with James's notion of the will or the
right to believe. This ethical theory of truth, to which attention has
also already been given, was specifically repudiated by Dewey. 5^ Thus,
in a review of James's Pragnatism , in an article entitled "What Pragmatism
Means by Practical," Dewey is explicit in the recognition of the con-
tradiction in James. He says;
Then arises the theory that ideas as ideas are always working
hypotheses concerning the attaining of particular empirical
results, and are tentative programs (or sketches of method)
for attaining them* If we stick consistently to this notion
of ideas, only consequences which are actually produced by
57* Dewey, "Development of American Pragmatism" in SHI, and Dewey in
Essays in Honor of William James *
58 . It will be dealt with more specifically in connection with Schiller*
59* Dewey, Art*(1908). Reprinted in S3L*
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the working of the idea in co-operation with, or application
to, prior existences are good consequences in the specific
sense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of
an idea* This is, at times, unequivocally recognised by Mr*
James. [Dewey then cites the passages in James3 ••• But at
other times any good which flows from acceptance of a belief
is treated as if it were an evidence, in so far, of the truth
of an idea* This holds particularly when theological notions
are under consideration* •** Since Mr. James has referred to
me as saying, "truth is what gives satisfaction," I may re-
mark (apart from the fact that I do not think I ever said
that truth is what gives satisfaction) that I have never iden-
tified any satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save satis-
faction which arises when the ideas as working hypotheses or
tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way
as to fulfill what that intends.
In summary of Dewey's contribution to pragmatism in the period cov-
ered by this thesis, it may be said that he attempted a precise logical
formulation of the concepts upon which it rested, developed the notion
of truth as verification, and saved pra^atism from an Incurable ambi-
guity*
60 * Dewey, EEL, 519“520 . Dewey also wrote a letter to Jeoues which is
printed in Perry, TOWJ, II, 550-551 on tlie matter which in substance
corresponds to the foregoing quotation*
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SCHILLER'S HUMANISM* THE DOCTRINE OP A MODERN PROTAGORAS
1
Introduction
This chapter is primarily concerned with Schiller's pragmatism* This
can best be understood, however, after consideration of his general philo-
sophic position* There is also included in this chapter consideration of
Love joy's acute criticism of the pragmatist epistemology* It was necessary
to postpone discussion of this article until the work of Schiller, as well
as that of Peirce, James, and Dewey, had been treated.
The external facts of the biography of Schiller do not require exten-
sive treatment* He was bom in I876 and died in 1957* He received his
\
educa ion at Rugby, Oxford, and Cornell* After four years as an instructor
at Cornell, he returned to Oxford for a time as a tutor* The major portion
of his philosophic career was spent at the U niversity of Southern
California*
Schiller's rcsnantic subjectivism as not had the influence of either
Peirce, James, or Dewey, but it is nonetheless important in the history of
the pragmatic movement*
Schiller possessed a felicitous style as well as a thorough knowledge
of langauges, both classical and modern* The enthusiasm he had for hie
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list of the various aspects of his thought. ^ He called it humanism, prag-
matism, personal idealism, pluralism, radical empiricism, voluntarism, an-
thropomorphism, briticism, and witticism. The name, however, he chose for
phis philosophy was humanism. It is the purpose of this section to discuss
some of the main features of this doctrine in order to provide a background
for the study of his contribution to pragmatism.
Historically Schiller felt his doctrine had its closest affiliation
with Protagoras. Frequently Schiller referred to Protagoras and always in
terms of the highest praise. Of the Protagorean doctrine that man is the
measure of all things, he said: "Fairly interpreted this is the truest and
most important thing any thinker has ever propounded." ^
The first question raised by this quotation is, who is the real
Protagoras? This is similar to the Socratic question. Schiller considered
this question in an article of I906 . ^ Plato’s Theaetetus is the book from
which Schiller feels he learned the most. ^ This dialogue is, of course,
not Socratic. Plato's refutation of the Sophists ^ consists in the asser-
tion that if man is the measure of all things then Protagoras should have
as well begun his "work on truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-
faced baboon, or some other yet strange monster which has sensation is the
measure of all things." ^ Presumably all would agree that the question
1. Quoted in Perry, TCWJ, II, 499*
2. Two of his books were entitled Humanism and Studies in Humanism.
5 . Schiller, HUM, XXI.
4. Schiller, Art.(1906).
5 . Schiller, SIH, XIII
6. It is not necessary to consider the other arguments advanced by Plato
against the Sophists to make Schiller's position clear.
7 . The Dialogues of Plato
.
(Jowett tr.), volume II, 584. Oxford University
Press, I87I.
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here raised is whether or not, on the Protagorean view, we are able to pro-
ceed from subjective to objective truth. For Plato, of course, this did
not seem possible; it is necesssiy to use the concept, or, in other words,
Plato's solution in the Theaetetuarlay "in the* doctrine of ideas#
Schiller, however, argued that direct evidence can be extracted from
Plato's own writings to show not only that Protagoras was able to surmount
the difficulty, but, although the evidence is in a Protagorean speech in
the Theaetetus
,
Plato did not imderstand the doctrine. If Plato had
understood Protagoras, Schiller felt that he would have accepted the doc-
trine that man is the measure of all things. The Protagorean answer, accord
ing to Schiller, consists in "recognizing distinctions of value among the
Q
individual perceptions to all of which reality is coixeded." ° If these
subjective judgments vary in value there will ensue "growing bodies of
objective truth, shared and agreed upon by all." ^
This doctrine is at the heart of Schiller's philosophy. Time and
again the same argimient is repeated, not always, of course, with its ref-
erence to Plato's Theaetetus and Protagoras. Such an argument has impor-
tant consequences. As a result for Schiller, metaphysics must have an
ethical basis. Sven our knowledge "is driven and guided at every step
by our subjective interests, our desires, our needs and our ends." The
consequence of this is to "utterly debar us from the cognition of ‘Reality*
as it is in itself and apart from our interests."
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This doctrine presents an interesting contrast to James, In the early
years of the pragmatist movement, both James and Schiller were anxious to
present a united front against wliat they conceived as their common foes.
Therefore, it is often difficult to formulate clearly the differences be-
tween them although such differences are unescap^ble. In this instance
there is a clear-cut difference, James had a metaphysics above and beyond
his theory of knowledge. This metaphysics was his doctrine of radical
empiricism. Schiller, however, as the foregoing quotation shows, took the
knowing process itself as a sample of reality, and, furthermore, the only
sample it was possible for us to have, James felt that this difference
was not important, for he, James, would arrive at a subjective view of
truth and Schiller would arrive at an objective view of reality. At this
point Schiller is much closer to Dewey and his view of "no antecedent
reality" than he is to James.
To bring about the instauration such a philosophy demands, Schiller
felt the necessity of a thoroughgoing reform of logic. For Schiller
logic cannot be abstracted from the psychological conditions of thinking.
Thinking depends on psychological processes such as interest, purpose, and
emotion. The fundamental logical conceptions such as necessity, certainty,
self-evidence, and truth are primarily psychical. Judgment is a personal
fact which cannot be dehiimanized, Intellectualistic logic breaks down in
15* Schiller's essay, "The Making of Reality" in SIR, 421-452, also develops
the thesis that reality cannot be considered outside the cognitive
process.
14. This reform Schiller attempted in two books; Formal Logic; A Scientific
and Social Problem and Logic for Use; An Introduction to the Volxmtaristic
Theory of Knowledge .
QT
yutae orij’ nl . oJ- .tassi,trrot» g'.ri'js3TS:^n c aa a.tne'sei.q p.i
+
a.h1T
o.t aucixrtx^-o-xy.'f' 'it : Li.r!x)S ;>nB aetCBl, '.tod * .^ronKovoax {.f^frigfr.'xq <S',:.t lo :n..^ev
. 330 a ncffifti-co 'iiorfJ- ce osv.foouoo :r.8iiw >ac''i*
.
.SectiuAf a ycr&BS’xc
-ed G 30 rtfti -"'Tji b ^^id ^£i0*lo s^ijX.o’Ano’l oi'
,
nH ox^lii; rs i'xo ex jft'ro'io'serir
..
eoafij-u-rii exrlj nX - Idx-q.aoaefj/j 31U3 aocrfei»'>'xib ((gx-'od.tl a arerfi .Tse>.:)
bnoYod bftxi <?tvc i« so.L8',t£'; s.tSMi; b be.’l aaeexiL . eontn':-
b
[o a ax o'sedd'
X.'^joibi ’i *io ealndoob ai;l sav eoxsydq e.i*'/: exrs'V . -'gbei 1<: \-50 -::r>>t eid
©rij Mood ,awcMa noi tadowp gnxojs'tc'; ©dd aa ^i&v©».'Of{ j-xsiXidoCi . ;':s foi'tXqi:. ©
ylno odd f-'ioir.Tr’rii'u/i ^bna (VdilaoT ©.i'(].r:ae a as IXoei'i ;,^.TXWoaM
3nriO-io‘5 '.M’b sidd darid dl©^' . ev^d od aa toI' ©Xcfxaooq, bxvj- -'i eic.jiot;
.
.it i
‘^‘Xo woXv ev.cd0'5'£;due r de 6vXt'sb dXjjov? .BOfxeL <sd toU ;;.t ter; r 3'»/
erdd dA .y.txiB©i 'to vaXv fv.tdochto ca da^ovx'i'xo fcX jov 'leiXxdoP rxi.-'f a'd.'.it
doobfto&daa on*' Xc w^'v aid yowed od -xsaoXo do;jn ei ioXX'.;.'oa dnxo:;
4 ©ojat cd EC od.n,.3dd "vdllsoa:
'ioXIIdot- jfllxsau:©0 \dqo8oXido a doj^s r.c.Ida'sxfBdsiii sdd duoda ^cxiri oT
leiixdoS . oigoX 'so ic.rsi.ogi'lgjji'Jicdd'.ifo ‘3:« ydiaapoon nc'd diod
. rtidrtxdd be jneidilMicy X.;?oi;ro.t^oov:3q ©.dd tao'jtb. bodiv-. ‘id'^’i..- fcf doctuiso octj-o'I






,’;dn;i*d'xeo tYdts;^^©^©^^ ©b dooa anoidqooiioc Xdi.o.It^cI iaditeeiebfixj'i 3dx .rtodJocc!©
t.
Ieac'!*jfeq a ;.i . taoxdcy^q YiXisij‘:.c'xq ©a.a dd~*id , 3o:3©b-:v3-'iios
wi iT.vcb ©Mee‘it» oiaio.' oidaxi.B .tdeoi X ©dcfl . ed .toexi -j./ dox.'!^ ion*!
I
aqoXov^.b osl/: ,?!cb;4i-XS.?^ .Ht?. cii "ydx.X.a.vH do ^nxMaM odT" tVabao xS'^Xic/.o;, .^X





.cd'-..9xq8 \ X att.'yo'*; : aMcod c’A"d fii bciq-s-i dda xoIXidoc. mi odx i altiT . '
’’





. t?7?b©XvfCrt-^ lo v\o('i'.7
80
its attempt to separate the ideal from the human. In the procesa both are
rendered meaningless. Once again he returned to Plato and claimed intel-
lectualistic logic represents the old error of Plato in the Theaetetus .
As we have seen, for Schiller '\netaphysics are in a manner luxuries." ^5
He did say, however: "Voluntarism is the metaphysic which most easily
accords and harmonizes with the experience with which all our thinking and
all oiu: living seem to overflow."
It is against such a background that Schiller's contribution to prag-
matism must be understood. In sum it may be said that humanism attempts to
interpret Protagoras in a manner consonant with modern thought. It is
primarily an epistemology and not a metaphysics. It demands the recognition
of the interrelatedness of logic and psychology. If it does offer a meta-
physics, which there is no logical necessity to have, it will result in a
voluntaristic metaphysics.
5
Schiller's Oontribution to Pragmatism
The first book of Schiller's which may be described as of a pragmatist
turn is a youthful work of I 89 I entitled Riddle of the Sphinx . This book
James characterized as "a pluralistic theistic book, of great vigor and
constructive originality ... quite in the lines which I incline to tread."
In its subtitle, Schiller termed it a study in the philosophy of evolution.
Schiller propounded in this book a doctrine which he termed "anthropomorphism."
15 * He develops this view in an essay "The Relations of Logic and Psychology"
in SIH, 71-115* First printed in the proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society of 190^-1906 ,
16 . Schiller, Art.(l905).
17« Quoted in Perry, TOWJ, II, 495.
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Ooncerning it he says;
For what conceivable meaning can be attached to the reproach that
a conception is anthropomorphic. Anthropomorphism means partaking
of the nature of man, and what hUx^an vision can fail to render the
peculiarity of human reason? Thus the prohibition of all reason-
ing in the supposed interests of a fiction of a non-anthroporaorphic
thought ... can never be known to exist and which, if it existed,
would be utterly inconceivable to us. Surely it is too plain for
words that all our thought and all feeling must be anthropomorphic,
After his adoption of the term hiimanism as the name for his doctrine, Schiller
called “anthropomorphism ••• a term whose dyslogistic usage it may prove dif-
ficult to alter." In a footnote to the same page he remarked that he
thought the term anthropomorphism needed re-wording. There is, however, no
statement implying that Schiller rejects the doctrine in anything but name.
In 1892 Schiller again foreshadowed his later pragmatism. This occurred
in a criticism of an article by D. G. Ritchie, an absolute idealist. It
is not necessary to dwell on this article for Schiller's remarks by way of
criticism are self-explanatory.
The plain man's things, the physicist's atoms, and Mr, Ritchie's
Absolute, are all of them more or less persevering and well-
considered schemes to interpret the primary reality of phenomenon,
and in this sense Mr. Ritchie is entitled to call the sunrise a
theory. But the chaos of presentations, out of which we have
(by criteria ultimately practical ) isolated the phenomenon we
subsequently call a sunrise, is not a theory, but the fact which
has called all theories into being* ..* But would he seriously
contend that he can already give an entirely consistent, coherent,
and intelligible view of the world? ... If he cannot why make
such a fuss about formal coherency and consistency as tVie test
of reality? By his own admission they represent a postulate which
is never actually realized.
18. Schiller, RS, 144-145.
19 . Schiller, SIR, XXI.
20. Ritchie's article was first published in the May Philosophical Review
of 1892 and later republished in a volijme entitled Darwin and Hegel *
* Schiller, Art*(1892)*21
o.p'.J :ic.X'iq*:r: e.^ic^ oj" ;'-t- u>j;:^J « gq' nr^o M'd^v xetnoo 'Ga’w ‘u/‘l
vc:t >: Msjr - orK;Tr^voqo'.TddfJB ei .'loidqeoKCX) :<<
3 :'- 'ie^ir- -; c^' JCr-s‘5 r;i^3 1'^c.^.^v nxi-Uf'' xt,‘i:ivj b^r^j <^ .•'. *5o “lo
-no&jPUT. ' T M lo no ; er-J- GuriT ?<rc 'JG»r.‘ud ';c yd C'lnxiuoeq
nxdqT:0';c.'qo‘>M htf-t-iTcrr 0 '?.» anldcJ': .- ':< G.'Gn*xj’Jnx fjeer/qqoa ^>iif ai ;^ni
t.j3vt?..b;3 i. ‘ix {r'oi.dv (stG .rs'ixe ad n%orc4 s< -i^>v‘jn ubo ... ddjiuofld
'lo'.. n.rrdlq oc.*" s.c dx ' v<. od sXc’sv.ceorcrHii: yfxoddL' ^>c bl.'cvir




jXix-i eiri -sr-X! ©dd e;-- nx^.f nr«xud :nd 3dd nfoidqcb^ exri 't9dx '.
Jb •'.vc'in ;tn'( di olJc.i?jCl<^yb t?scir(v/ iTn&d e ... rsx/lq'u;cf(oqo*x:idrt;»“ fonilax
ort
,
;I nTL':u-("! .^.xibibvi-xi faepexn raedilrr'iioinc .lo'i.'i.tfTii i,-y d edd drfjuodd
, ;:j XXI dud :»i:ind\as ijx oa.fidocb odd f-.do©f;3'Ji leXIxdoS dje.^d ^lixvJqffix v^-xat-ie'.t.adG
d-ip-ooo a.ldi . . jI.d.siagG I.; odsjf <uf( bi^voborifseio': al^^B 'islllbac: SQSJ nl
dl . da ci.^ebi; ndiilosila au? ^<=iliodxfi .tl yc floid'ie axj '^o ipaXoxd.r'ia £ fix
do 73.0 vJ a'.X'i ij'se'i a'T3lI.aiaJ 'xod aXoxd'ia ex-Xd nc iiow.b od v’lsae.eoon doif si
.
yxodan ' X'c5 if’i-'iiaa f-'.3 incioidi^a




-Xl'pv i. .r: x.ai'tavop'. iq seel *2C 's'xox: t. td.t aC ©"ste ity-^ij^cadA
<(,:/.x'3ffxTtirlc. 'io ydxiaoi yxat.xiq ©xld ds'iqiadai od ijoi^x-dsaco
a cxixnrjv’r erJd Jiao ct aaiiidno 4.1 eJiiCMi’dh oais&a *?ixld rix i>ne
tv dsijiw ‘‘tc. juc eaq do -;op'."o ©dd i/xS .\TCt)dd
§<ff rtarto;non^r>q ttfid fj^daXoai i . yl -pd cicidX;-.' y *')
‘
.::riv{ Jpa'i orfd tuo ,\ic®.:d n dor? ai ,,©airn;.a a {dao YXdfieupeacf.oo
\Xa;;xo.;:-iisa td i)Ii/cw dr— ... idfci; eaxioend I fa iiaiX&p yrd
,-rfiX'iadco tJTJedaitf'Ko ' ua avij; y&jpa-:i,3 ueo afi darid biiedooo , i
e>l3in \'dw dor.iu-o en “iX’ . . . I'blxOK Hsdd lo 'Oiv fclJl;5,XXI©dfiX . „
da&d yrfd pb v*>:i^d£ .iErtoo bii.3 yofjo’if'ffoo iOli; iuodB aeu^i .a iloon
ifo'x’if exftXudeoq ,8 dnoaain.o’i \ar!d sioxa^iab ’ nwo eiri yX. Vyddixiex lo
.t'iK L 1 \n.wd.7fi Ttvfn ai
. I- ' ''I ,21;
,
•««i I .td . .vi
.iXX ,HI£
,
-lei lid o<5 .
nvl v^F X AO Iric o vcl
I
ff'-j y:-. ;;i befjeilduc d-xil'i aav f.iotd“;« e ' x-lxlpdi/l .OS
0. ; i i 'd • b-ft Xdidito ©oiijlov « .'^i hodaifdoqoa xPdeX bf-.a S9X'X lo
. ';sqei ;. .tiA . rs
82
Thia quotation atresses the subjective factor in knowledge, a theme to which
Schiller again end again returned throughout his philosophic career. In an
interesting footnote to this early work Schiller described himself as “having
been a pragmatist myself without knowing it, and that little but the name was
lacking to my advocacy of an essentially cognate position in 1892.“
Schiller first called his doctrine pragmatic in an essay of 1902 en-
titled “Axioms as Postulates." in this essay Schiller remarked that the
oilterms pragmatism and radical empiricism as labels are not quite satisfactory.
After this declaration, Schiller defined pragmatism as follows:
The general structure of the mind and the fundamental principles
that support it also must be conceived as growing up, like the
rest of our powers and activities, that is, by a process of ex-
perimenting, designed to render the world conformable to our
wishes. They will begin their career, that is, as demands we
make upon our experience or in other words as postulates, and
their subsequent sifting, which promotes some to be axioms and
leads to the abandonment of others, which it turns out to be too
expensive or painful to maintain, will depend on the experience
of their working.
The essay is concerned v.’ith logical theory; it attempts what may be
described as experimentalist, empirical logic as opposed to either the tradi-
tional Aristotelian logic or the intellectualistic logic of the absolute
idealists
.
Any attempt to locate a priori principles of human knowledge rests for
Schiller on a fundamental confusion. He says:
When we speak of the a priori principles implied in the existence
of all knowledge, do we mean implied logically or psychologically?
22. Schiller, HUM, XIII.
25 . Essay by Schiller in Sturt (ed.)^PI.
24. Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 65 .
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Are they, that is, the products of a logical analysis or psychical
facts? Is the priority asserted priority in time (psychical fact)
or priority in idea (logical order)? Or horrible dictu
,
can it be
shown that the a priori
,
as it is used, is a little of both, or
each in turn and that the whole apriorist account of our axioms
rests on this fundamental confusion.
For Schiller the empiricist logic, as it stands, is now more usable as
an account of our axioms. Axioms on the empiricist account are "the ficti-
tious imprints of psychologically impossible experience on a purely passive
mind."
The failure of both the apriorist and empiricist account of our axioms
springs from the same source—their intellectualism . It must be realized
p Qthat "the organism is active and the organism is one."
Thought on this view must be conceived as "an outgrdwth of action,
knowledge of life, intelligence of will, while the brain ... must be regarded
as the subtlest, latest, and most potent organ for effecting adaptions to the
29
needs of life." This is essentially the same teleological conception of
mind developed by James in his Psychology . Dewey adopted this view through
the influence of James, as a basis for his instrumentalism. Dewey calls
this conception ’the influence of Darwin on philosophy.'
The implications for logic of such a conception were clear for Schiller.
He sai d
:
By conceiving the axioms as essentially postulates made with an
ultimately practical end, we bridge the gap that has been arti-
ficially constructed between the function of our nature, and
overcome the errors of intellectiialism. We conceive the axioms
26. Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 72.
27« Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 84.
28. Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 85.
29. Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 85.
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as arising out of man's needs as an agent, as promoted by his de-
sires, as affirmed by hie will, in a word as nourished and sus-
tained by his emotional and volitions! nature. ^
This type of logical theory was close to the pragmatism of James.
Of this Schiller was well aware. He wrote;
Practical postulation is the real meaning of his mixch mis-
construed doctrine of the will to believe. It is not so much
an exhortation concerning what we ought to do in the future
as analysis of what we have done in the past. And the crit-
ics of the doctrine have mostly ignored the essential addition
to the will to believe, viz, at your risk, which leaves ample
scope for the testing of the assumed belief by experience of
its practical results.
James, as a later section of this chapter will show, made an uneasy
peace with this theory.
In the following year, 1905* Schiller published an article entitled
"The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics." Here his avowal of pragmatism is
more specific. He defined it as:
The thorough recognition that the purposive character of
mental life must influence and pervade also our most re-
motely cognitive activities. ... It is a conscious appli-
cation to the theory of life of the psychological facts of
cognition as they appear to a teleological voltintarism
.
... Pragmatism may be said to assign metaphysical validity
to the typical method of ethics.
The looseness and lack of precision in the foregoing definitions and others
Schiller offers is conscious, end, from his point of view, desirable. He
said of hie definition of pragmatism, "This is wider and, I think, more
fundamental than any of the definitions in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology ."
50. Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 86.
51 • Schiller in Sturt (ed.), PI, 9I.
52. Schiller, Art.(l905). Republished in 1905 in Schiller's Humanism
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In essence it may be said that Schiller’s pragmatism is an ethical
theory of truth. The meaning of truth for Schiller is satisfaction. The
truth consists in any useful consequences that follow from ideas or beliefs.
This theory of truth as satisfaction was included in James's Pragmati sm.
In juxtaposition to this in Pragmati am there is also the theory of truth as
verification. The relevant passages are worth quotation. In "Lecture II"
of Pragmati sm James says*
That ideas (which are themselves but parts of our experience)
beccmie tru just in so far as they help us to get into satis-
factory relations with other parts of our e^^erience,^^
In "Lecture VII" there is one notable statement which adheres to the
verification theory of truth. The passage is as follows:
But all roads lead to Romo, and in the end and eventually,
all true processes must lead to the face of directly verify-
ing sensible experience somewhere, which somebody's ideas
have copied,
The theory of truth as verification James had held bas far back as 1885,^^
The question arises, however, concerning the source from which James derived
his theory of truth as satisfaction,
James was not always cldar as the the sources of his ideas. It is, however,
a reasonable inference that James derived the theory of truth as satisfaction
from Schiller, In "Lecture II" of Pragmatism , James, with characteristic
generosity, credits his theory of truth (in the singular) to Dewey and Schiller,
Dewey, on the other hand, as has been shown, was explicit in disawowing con-
55* James, PRA, 58,
54, James, PRA, 215,
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nection with the theory of truth as satisfaction. Schiller, on the other
hand, embraces this theory as valid* It seems fairly safe, therefore, to
attribute the theory of truth as satisfaction to Schiller.
4
The Debate of Bradley and Schiller
The group of articles to be considered here is not entirely typical of
the polemic articles appearing in philosophic journals in this early period.
In these articles of Schiller and Bradley there is reflected a personal
animosity not becoming either of the parties involved, an animosity almost
entirely lacking in most journal articles. Consideration of this exchange
of articles throws into high relief one aspect of the pragmatic move-
ment in its early years.
Francis Herbert Bradley v/as one of pramatism% moat distinguished
critics. He was a champion of absolute idealism and a formidable dialecti-
cian. As new philosophical opinions appeared, Bradley's reply to them was
always the same—the ideas were to be found in Hegel. Although philosophi-
cally poles apart, Bradley and James had a warm personal regard and a keen
interest in one another's work. There was, however, no such regard
between Schiller and Bradley. With Bradley in mind, Schiller wrote "the
agnostic maunderings of impotent despair are flung aside with a contemptu-
ous smile, by the young, the strong, and the virile." To this sally
Bradley replied; "This is certainly young, indeed I doubt if at any time
56 . Perry, TCWJ, II, 480-486
57 . Schiller, HUM, viii.
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of life most of us have been as young as this." More of the personal
castigation of Schiller contained in this article need not be considered
here •
Concerning the philosophic criticism of the pragmatist doctrine,
Bradley's rejection of it was based on its ultimate criterion of the truth
as the practical, the satisfactory, or the verifiable. As his criticism
was directed at the authors of Personal Idealism , and more particularly at
Schiller as their self-elected leader, the validity and import of his
criticism must be understood as applying only to Schiller's version. He
says:
The gospel of practice for the sake of practice and everything
else for the sake of practice, makes, I doubt not, a good cry.
But it will satisfy in the end only those who have not asked
what practice is. Practice we have found to consist in my
alteration of existence. ... V/e seem to place the end in mere
quantity of doing. ... Unless I am to take mere quantity of
doing as ay end, I can myself find in the end no sense in the
cry of practice for the sake of practice.
The reply of Schiller to Bradley, "In Defence of Humanism" was more
temperate and conciliatory than was his accustomed style. Schiller's prin-
ciple claim was that nowhere had he stated "that truth consists in the mere
working of an idea." That the text of "Axioms as Postulates" as a whole,
countenanced Bradley's interpretation of Schiller's doctrine there can be
little doubt. Schiller criticized Bradley's emphasis on the 'mere practical
working.' As Schiller offered no other alternatives for ideas than that of
their working satisfactorily, it is hard to see the point of his contention
58. Bradley, Art.(1904).
59« Bradley assured James that he was "far from suggesting that-there is
nothing in pragmatism." Perry, TCWJ, II, 486.
40. Bradley, Art. (1904), 518, 5I9.
41 . Schiller, Art.(1906).
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that he had been misrepresented by Bradley.
Bradley again attacked pragmatism in an article entitled "On Truth
42
and Copying." The established points of difference at this time between
the pragmatist and the absolutists were on the nature of truth. Bradley
asked several questions of the pragmatist, the relevance of which to the
establislied points of difference, or even their instrinsic importance,
it is difficult to see. Legitimately enough it would seem, he inquired
of the pragmatist "whether the practical side of our nature is to be made
supreme, or whether there is anything else which he s value and rights
of its own." 45 Of the humanist he inquired whether 'finite mind' is to
stand merely for some of the inhabitants of a single planet, or is to
have a far wider meaning. ^ He was also desirous of knowing "how the
individuals stand to the whole. ... If the individuals are the final re-
alities, what in the end are we to say of 'together' and the whole proc-
ess."
Schiller's reply to Bradley in the same year ^ is too minute for
consideration. In this article there is the same well-ploughed ground




In the vast amount of literature written during the early years of the
42. Bradley, Art.(1907).
45 . Bradley, Art.(1907), 179*
44. Bradley, Art.(1907), 180.
45 . Bradley, Art.(1907), 180.
46. Schiller, Art.(1907).
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movement, the article by A. 0. Love joy, "The Thirteen Pragmatisms," is
one of the most acute and penetrating criticisms of the pragmatist epistemology
As Was noted in the foregoing, Lovejoy's critique was concerned with
the varieties of pragmatisms. It was not specifically concerned with
Schiller, but his version had at best as many latent ambiguities as any
other. Love joy first asks if it "is perhaps not too much to ask thst
contemporary philosophers should agree to attach some single and stable
meaning to the term pragmatism." His announced purpose in this article
was not "to contribute to determination of the truth or falsity of any one of
these doctrines."
Commencing his analysis with the variant doctrines as they first
appeared historically, he distinguishes pragmatism as a doctrine concern-
ing the meaning of propositions. This is the pragmatism of Peirce and of
James's Berkeley address of I898 . Lovejoy's statement of it is as
follows:
The meaning of any proposition whatever is reducible to the future
consequences in experience which that proposition points, conse-
quences which those who accept the proposition ipso facto antici-
pate as experience that somebody is subsequently to have.
A theory concerning the meaning of a proposition is not the same as a
theory of the truth criterion. James, in his Pragmatism
,
was clearly con-
scious of this distinction, and accepted as valid *both doctrines. Lovejoy,
however, thought that James had not "sufficiently insisted upon the logical
disconnectedness of the two theories." The acceptance of either one of
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Pragmatism, as a theory of meaning, "because of latent ambiguity in
its terms" has two separate and quite divergent meanings. The first of
these is that the "meaning of a proposition consists in the future con-
sequences which it (directly or indirectly) predicts as aboirt to occur,
no matter whether it be believed or not." The alternative meaning is
easily recognizable after the first has been uncovered. "The meaning
of a proposition consists in the future consequences of believing it."
It is in the first sense, that the theory of meaning suggests a theory
of truth as verification.
Often this latter doctrine is not separated from the doctrine that
those propositions are true which will work. The evolutionary empiri-
sists, with whom this latter doctrine is usually associated, mean that
those judgments are true which hitherto have worked. In more precise
words it may be put as follows;
The thinker in advance of the actual realization or verifi-
cation of the future experiexices which may be predicted by
a given judgment, entitled to regard it as true if it is
similar to, or is a special application of, a general class
of judgnents which ... memory tells ... have thus far had
their implied predictions realized.
This doctrine is not identical with the doctrine that an individual
judgment can become true as the experiences it points to and prognosti-
cates comes into consciousness.
The doctrine that a belief is true if it ’works* is ambiguous in a
way analogous to the pragpiatist theory of meaning. There are two senses
in which a belief may be said to work. First, it may have its actual
predictions fulfilled. Secondly, by contributing to the energies.
il aO ,'^n:irt,seai “ic X'iowf};^ a ee ^maic^atcgsiH
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This theory of the truth as what works, the theory of the ex post
facto nature of trvrth, is a "somewhat blurred reflection" of a meta-
physical doctrine. It is "the doctrine of the real futurity or open-
ness of the future, and of the determinative or creative efficiency of
each present moment in the ever transient process of conscious judgment,
choice, and action."
With the foregoing quotations, a fair sampling of the acute analy-
sis to which Lovejoy subjected the pragmatist doctrines is given. It
does not seem, however, essential to give an exposition of the manner in
which he separatee all the thirteen variants of pragmatism. His treat-
ment follows the historical order in which the doctrines came into us-
age by pragmatists. Lovejoy also classifies the doctrines according to
a topical order; this will be followed in presenting the totality of
pragmatisms.
Ttere are four separate categories into which Lovejoy' s baker's
dozen fall. The first of these categories is pragmatism as a theory of
meaning. Within this category three distinct variants are distinguisha-
ble. They are as follows:
The meaning of any judgment consists wholly in the future
consequences predicted by it, whether it is believed or
not. ... The meaning of any judgment consists in the future
consequences of believing it. The meaning of any judgment
always consists in part in the apprehension of the rela-
tion of some object to a conscious purpose.
Secondly, there is the category of pragnatism as "an epistemologi-
cally functionless theory concerning the nature of truth." This variant
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of pragmatiem contends that:
The tmth of a judgment consists in the complete realization
of the experience..* to which the judgnent had antecedently
pointed; propositions are not, but only become true.
In the third place, there are pragmatist theories of knowledge.
These deal with ’’the criterion of the validity of a judgment." There
are eight distinguishable species of pragmatism in this category. There
are those "general propositions which are tx*ue in so far as in past ex-
perience they have had their implied predictions realized." Secondly,
those propositions "which have in past experience proven biologically
serviceable to those who have lived by them." Third, apprehension of
truth as a species of satisfaction. Foxirth, "the criterion of truth of
a judgment is its satisfactoriness, as such; satisfaction is many dimen-
sional ... The maximum bulk of satisfaction in a judgment is a mark of
its validity." Fifth, the criterion of truth for a judgment is the
degree in which it meets the theoretic demands of our nature. Sixth,
there is no absolute truth but only postulated truth. Seventh, there
are "some necessary truths; these are neither many nor practically ade-
quate; and beyond them resort to postulation is needful and legitimate."
Eighth, "among the legitimate postulates taken as equivalent of truth
the moral, religious, and aesthetic, have a co-ordinate basis with those
which are presupposed by physical science and common sense."
In the fourth category pragmatism is a doctrine with ontological
significance. "Temporal becoming is a fundamental character of reality;
in this becoming the processes of consciousness have their essential and
creative part."
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Lovejoy's conclusion is the natural one to draw. It is as follows:
What the movement so named most needs is a clarification of its
formulas, and a discrimination of certain sound and important
ideas lying behind it, from certain other ideas that are sound
but not important, and certain others that would be important
if only they were not unsound.
Lovejoy offers his article as a species of ”Prolegemona zu einem kunftigen
Pragmatismus ."
James's reaction to this article offers an interesting note on its
reception by a pragmatist. He had received galleys of the article and
returned them to Lovejoy with profuse marginal comments. Some of Lovejoy 's
criticisms were referred to as 'captiousi' 'cavils,' and * Spitzfindigkeiten .
'
Between Lovejoy and James there was also an exchange of correspondence some
of the relevant passages of which are as follows. Said James:
As a pragmatist, I welcome all your distinctions and more.
... You give an impression (certainly not intended) of argu-
ing as if, because so many things go into the natural history
of truth, they must cancel each other, and the learner must
fall back on intellectualism with its inexplicable term
agreement.
In answer to this letter Lovejoy replied in part to James as follows:
On the whole, I'm sure pragmatism has been a big and useful
thing; but it has, I'm equally sure, now reached the point
where it's in danger of doing more harm than good, if the
movement be not purged of certain latent tendencies. ... We
should all cease thinking of the movement as a movement,
reduce pragmatism to certain cold-blooded and entirely spe-
cific propositions, and begin to examine, first, their pre-
cise meaning; second, their consistency and relations inter
se ; and third, the reasons for thinking any of them true.
48. Quoted in Perry, TOWJ, II, 482
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Although there have been other tendencies in American thoughti at the
turn of the century, American philosophy was idealistic. Historically,
idealism may be classified into four main types. Platonic idealism asserts
the objectivity of value. Berkeleyan idealism stresses that the fundamental
reality of the universe is mental in nature. Hegelian idealism asserts that
reality is organic as well as mental. Lotzean idealism holds that reality
is personal.
In its origins pragmatism was a revolt against the Berkeleyan and
Hegelian forms of idealism. Against the former it developed a new theory of
truth; the latter it rejected because it led to what James termed a 'block
universe .
'
Pragmatism meant different things to different men, but one touchstone
of the doctrine is a faith in empiricism. This does not imply, however, that
all empiricists are pragmatists.
During the iSyO's Peirce, James,
_
and others met frequently anc among the
topics discussed by their so-called Metaphysical Club was Bain's definition
of belief as "that upon which a man was prepared to act." For Peirce
pragmatism was but a corollary to this definition. The fruits of these dis-
cussions, as far as they effected him, Peirce published in a series of papers
in 1878.
The definition given by Peirce in I878 was quoted by James in an ad-
dress of 1898 . The pragmatic movement is generally considered to date from
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As a result of James's article, the writings of Schiller, and its adop-
tion by literary men, the doctrine underwent a shift in meaning from that
originally intended by Peirce* He, therefore, chose the term pragmaticiam
to express the meaning he intended# For Peirce pragmatism was a philosophic
method, a maxim of logic, and a metaphysical doctrine stressing scholastic
realism. This realism led him to conceive of truth in terms of an un-
changing universe of universes* This view is in sharp contrast to the
views of the other pragmatists* It is also to be noted that for Peirce the
doctrine bears no relation to psychology* Peirce felt his philosophy to
be a corrected Kantianism with the thing-in-itself eliminated.
James conceived of pragmatism as valuable for clearing the path for
the physical doctrine he termed radical empiricism. Although «npiricism
is characteristic of James's whole philosophy, raiical empiricism is a
specific metaphysical doctrine consisting of three parts* The first part is
a postulate holding that the only proper method and subject matter of
philosophy is material drawn f rom experience* Although James asserts there
to be no necessary connection between pragmatism and radical empiricism,
this postualte is perfectly consistent with the definition of pragmatism
in the California address of 1893 *
The second component of radical empiricism is a statement of fact* This
statement assets that the relations of conjunction are as much a matter of
direct personal experience as are the relations of disjunction* Traditional
empiricism, on James's view, has always stressed the relations of disjunction*
This notion of James's concerning the importance of the relations of conjunctiion
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he 8 been called his deepest metaphysical insight.
The generalized conclusion, implicit in the postulate and the statement
of fact, is that reality is an experience continuum. The universe, as it is
directly apprehended, possesses, in its own right, a concatenated or con-
tinuous structure.
Radical empiricism was not received without criticism. One of the
most searching analyses was given by Warner Fite. The burden of his objec-
tion was that James had not sufficiently made clear the difference between
pure and subjective experience. James might claim, said Fite, that pure
experience antedated or was prior to subjective experience, but that wherever
James might locate pure experience, it was always precisely coextensive with
subjective experience. In reply to this objection James asserted a realistic
doctrine with a belief in the reality of extra-mental facts. Had James
always been as specific in maintaining his realism, much needless polemic
might have been avoided. As a recent convert from idealism, James frequently
lapsed into its terminology.
The doctrine of radical empiricism was also attacked in what James came
to call the Miller-Bode objections. These objections coincided with doubts
in the mind of James. For ten years he struggled with tViem and his exact
opinion remains in doubt. In hie Psychology James had treated of the stream
of consciousness, stressing its uniqueness and indivisibility. At this
stage in his thought James still maintained the duality of thought and its
object. The doctrine of pure experience, however, renounced this duality
and had only experiences. This posed a dilemma. If experiences possessed
the uniqueness of thoughts they lost their character of comraonness in a
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common external world. On the other hand, were experiences to possess their
characteristics of commonness in a common external world, their character of
uniqueness was lost. Ultimately James was forced to give up the logic of
identity for what he felt experience ultimately taught; namely, that ex-
periences retained both the characteristics of uniqueness and commonness in
a common external world. Ultimately, James was forced to say that experience
retained its characteristics both of uniqueness and commonness. James
realized that such a doctrine opposed the logic of identity as he conceived
it.
For James pragmatism was to be used as a method for demonstrating radi-
cal empiricism. It was also for James a theory of truth~perhaps the most
original and controversial aspect of pragmatism.
It is generally considered that pragmatism began as a movement after
the publication of James's California address of I898. It can be shown,
however, that James had held the notion of pragmatism both as a method and
as a theory of truth at least twenty years prior to I898.
One of the most acute critics of pragmatism in its early years was
James's friend and colleague, Josiah Royce. Royce employed against James's
pragmatism his famous dialectic of the possibility of error. For Royce the
possibility of truth or error depends on the existence of an infinite judge,
the Absolute, for an idea is not true to itself but to a second idea and
this to a third ad infinitum . James, however, felt that the truth relation
could be expressed by terms falling altogether within the finite mind. The
Absolute on this view becomes a needlessly postulated entity in violation
of parsimony.
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Another typical article critical of pragmatism was by Ralph Barton
Perry who argued against what he thought was the anti-intellectualism of
James and his emphasis on the merely useful* For James, however, subjective
needs played a vital role in the nature of things. Purennaturalism for
Jsones was an abstraction of thought*
Although he did not wish to join in a controversy over truth, he found
it necessary to do so by the many misconceptions to which the pragmatist
doctrines became subject* For example, pragmatism was not simply a re-
editing of positivism or an appeal to action*
In fine, it may be said that twenty-five centuries of philosophy had
produced two theories of truth; the correspondence theory, and the coherence
theory* James's principle contribution to pragmatism was sui attempt to for-
mulate and make explicit a functional or pragmatic theory of truth based on
the notion of truth as a functional relation of an idea to its object* This
is opposed to both the correspondence theory of common-sense and the
deductive theory of coherence; it is an inductive theory of truth*
John Dewey, in contrast to James and Peirce, had not developed hie
thought in the early yeats of the pragmatist movement* It can be fairly
demonstrated, however, that the main lineaments of his thought were estab-
lished by 1910* In his Studies in Logical Theory, Dewey's conception of
philosophy is laid down* He describes philosophy as having three areas of
study represented best by three concentric circles* The inner circle is
occupied by reflective logic or what Dewey calls inquiry* Some of the
implications of inquiry will be more fully developed later* The second
area represents some of the typical modes of human experience; it includes
the aesthetic, religious, and scientific realms* The outer circle is concerned
tdcjj\h ,> r-.i /,i-'?5r,>vo-;,'n 1c •
A ltda j fy» vr;^ tJ8*'w .R.vr-j-fi cr:«- ynw'.!
wi;rot>j'ciJe » • ?. v/j I,
-jc^ . c;.:j- y..v.^v;.t *,rfj r.D n.tu-ii^u.e LxtCJ et.-.frL
sol- ara.^Ixi lo enff i;-i: arii’ n.r >“x in>, .'v ? i ' v;-*'!'.'




•-.* lavo ys^.-jovo-i jjito /i ui c-j- " *r, jon 14*'- e;t . . t .C/^
laio -?ui?'»’ac -.iic dc-jil''! of yjiOxiqeoijOvC.-iT ©rli yc c* c> cl y-**:,c;t:-oa>.T
' *'''
'i'_ ..fe vOii £.!.' ?( seiJ-iioasi'i •'- ea»»f»u ..©•xiiloch
i r ol Ixtpqcj.c oa ‘lo /•TiiVAliBi'O -p-ss f- hc
bjsci y;':%c".,c 1c- r. &d yjepi li al
eorre7£i-{»;ti f'cit far. s :;-u£.r;t r ; r.clccu’Cft'i'sCo •-A.r'- i
'
'
c r-oiv:;»dl o'?i<i‘ leotir <.",<
n.’S 6-6'?.
'.
‘-cfiS.-'-jq ot nollwciil.-.'jSDr' ..' ijc "'«'.
' iic b9 '.f <i ii.-r.C'.l Ic '.fjcivdl c to .N' c ;;.,r:- :.r.. r; .;r,!,c .rM::: ' 7 iiS;jc
M“:>r-l-:c i..4 c.- m-l ': -u^ 'lo xxoiX-tfiot uirx-'l ? srl^Liz-t ac ^a.:.^^oia biil
«f‘;f f-r.i. o;)nc‘j -. v i. .'i'-.c ’u' v'':c' 4ut ici:evi:C' £6'fto;. -.'il --Slod z»l bcavc./]0 eX
.'’ix'tl >£ '4 ';r:faa' t viJ-o-u*. :4 H: al 1* ;eorri *lc poovdl *jfc£.fc
e ht L':-.rir>vot lo». ..' b«/< •:v;---,', M tc.'-- litoo t.lt £..Cw
y.C-; .fo’i f-d oP5 j , , .i.ni'ii'vc-f' *6.? lo <-.r;a©., S'Xt.-.-ti r?iii c.^ lAijacrll
-dAiles* r<te“ 4 ' i.i/ lo alnscsf^ril x;fi.'.: . . .j ,^wVf>T‘cr:
'lo ;-.£D:a cm yfiqcr c 4dij at-61\o :^'-t 4 .oh Ii/;q
:!.i o oix. ao.r-.rf' ‘.ai,' .'>l5'‘x2o oXtinaoiTO*-. y;d ?:.< fc&daori*. •vfa.io
&S..T *10
-.juGa ,y-' it.' ‘..njsD yr..>-4/.i .Kfirf# K' o.JyoI ovl + r^^ list yJ i>e.i%ijcoo
fa«tr.£5i
.s*?-.;::, ^M'iOicvob y ilt« y.iwpni *o Hi',i4Jjcoiixi.xi
ar'h|i,'oni irica^i i:T.efr.!.' a .-'i :jurf lo ceihoa: X.:=:.v,iqyi od- lo ©tioc nJaaae'iqet ret/)
Cv.r> reotitej ai eioaio tdvoo odl . aXAint o ila<>i?-e he:- ,i:ac.!:£;H jv. Uciiicnjs sri.t
99
with cultural institutions; the class of problems treated are those commonly
termed as social problems. These three areas are interrelated; they are
functional distinctions within the inclusive field of experience.
For Dewey such an approach implies thct philosophy is to leave the
study and go into the market place. The philosophic method for such an
approach is empirical, but its validity as a method is in the beginning
begged. Given the initial assumption of the method, however, its usefulness
for Dewey validates it.
Dewey, for the first fifteen years of his philosophic career, was an
idealist. By 1904, however, he had rejected idealism. In order to under-
stand his instrumentalism, it is necessary to treat briefly his rejection
of idealism.
During his early philosophic career Dewey was under the influence of
Georgs Sylvester Morris. Morris, who believed in innate ideas, gave Dewey
the weapons which he has used throughout his life against a spectator theory
of knowledge. Morris, under the influence of Hegel, also held that experience
was a living organic whole and that analytic empiricism rendered it lifeless.
From this doctrine of internal relations, Dev/ey had the weapons to attack
dualism. Thus, while still an idealist, Dev^ey began his long tilts against
passivity, discontinuity, and dualism.
Another early teacher of Dewey, G. Stanley Hall, taught that philosophy
was nothing but psychology. This Wundtian doctrine was, of course, in con-
tradiction to the tendency of Morris. Dev/ey, as a result, was forced to
think out the problem of the relation of philosophy and psychology for him-
self. Dewey's attempt at a reconciliation was attempted in two papers of
1886. Here he employed the traditional idealistic dialectic of the universal
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conscioueness . ConscioueneeB and growth may be observed by others and from
this the inference was drawn, therefore, that a universal consciousness must
exist.
As late as I889 Dewey's allegiance to idealism remained unabated. This
is shown by a favorable review of T. H. Green written in that year. In I89O,
however, Dewey delivered a devastating criticism of Green's position. The
burden of this was the supererogatory nature of the universal self-consciousness
of idealism as a principle of explanation.
The influence of Darwinian biology on the thought of Dewey was profovind.
His acceptance of the implications of Darwinian biology made necessary the re-
jection of certain Hegelian doctrines he hsd previously espoused. For Hegelian
idealism the world must in a sense be constituted by thought before there is
any mind to think. The way is thus paved for the universal self-consciousness
as a principle of explanation. Darwin's analysis, however, stressed man's
capacity for thought as a natural outcome of certain forces of adjustment.
Dewey was not unaware of the influence of Darwin on his thoughts; he gave a
leading place to Darwin in a volxme of his essays. Dewey's notion of conflict
can only be understood in its relation to Darwin.
The instrumentalism Dewey developed was rooted in logic. This logic,
however, rejected both the traditional formal logic and the Hegelian transcend-
ental logic. The former to Dewey was mere intellectual gymnastic; the latter
he espoused during his idealistic period, but he came to reject it because it
left no reality except in universal mind. Thought for Dewey, in his Studies
in Logical Theory
,
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Dewey's version of praginatisni he terms instrxxmentalism . It has as his-
torical antecedents the behavioristic school of psychology and the psychology
of V/illiem James. The behavioristic psychology attempts a physiological ac-
count of behavior which the instrumentalist finds congenial. On this view
the central nervous system occupies an intermediate position between the
environment and the needs of the organism. James in his Psychology stressed
two notions which the instrumentalist used and developed. The first is the
conception of relations having as important a place as qualities in the
stream of consciousness. The second is James's teleological conception of
mind. On this view man is a "fighter for ends."
Dewey's version of pragmatism has particularly stressed as experimental
theory of knowledge. Truth on this conception is verifiability. Such a
notion had its origin in James's speculation concerning objective reference
and the possibility of the future of the stream of experience being such a
case of objective reference. Dewey accepted this notion and added to it the
idea that the meaning of an idea always contains a plan of action.
Dewey's version of pragmatism has also had a negative aspect of impor-
tance. In James's Pragmatism there were two theories of truth in juxtaposi-
tion. One of these theories, truth as verifiability, Dewey accepted; the
other, an ethical notion of truth, held that ideas were to be held as true
if good consequences came from believing them. This notion Dewey unequivo-
cally rejected as being incurably ambiguous.
The romantic subjectivism of Schiller has not had the influence of
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The name Schiller chose for his philosophic doctrine was humanism.
Historically, Schiller felt that his doctrine had its closest affiliations
with Protagoras. Accepting, then, the Protagorean doctrine that man is
the measure of all things, the question arises as to how we ere to proceed
from subjective to objective truth. Plato's solution lay, of course, in the
doctrine of ideas.
Schiller, however, felt that Plato did not understand Protagoras. Had
he understood Protagoras he would have realized that it was possible to pro-
ceed from subjective truth to objective truth by recognizing distinctions of
value to which all might agree among the individxial perceptions.
As a result of this doctrine, metaphysics, for Schiller, has an ethical
basis. At this point there is a clear-cut difference between Schiller and
James. James had a metaphysics, radical empiricism, above and beyond hie
pragmatism. Schiller took the knowing process itself as a sample of reality.
Schiller's doctrine committed him to the belief in the necessity of a
reform in logic* Logic could not be separated in his mind from psychological
conditions of thinking.
Although his doctrine does not require a metaphysics, voluntarism is the
metaphysics which most easily accords with his humanism.
As early as I89 I Schiller, in his Riddle of the Sphinx , taught a doc-
trine which may consciously be called pragnatic. Here, in criticism of
traditional logical theory, he advanced the doctrine that our postulates,
as they work satisfactorily, become axioms. This doctrine is, of course,
very close to the will to believe of James. In 1395 Schiller termed prag-
matism a. doctrine assigning metaphysical validity to the typical method of
ethics. In other words, the essence of Schiller's pragmatism is that of
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an ethical theory of truth.
James included this ethical theory of truth in his Pragmatism^ This
theory was in juxtaposition to the theory of truth as verification. It is
a reasonable inference that James derived this theory of truth from Schiller*
Schiller's doctrines were severely criticized by Francis Herbert
Bradley* From his standpoint of absolute idealism, Bradley objected to the
doctrine that truth consisted in the working of an idea.
In 1908 A*0* Lovejoy wrote an acute article entitled "The Thirteen
Pragmatisms*" In this article Lovejoy distinguished four categories of
pragmatist doctrines; pragmatism as a theory of meaning, an epistemologically
functionless theory concerning the nature of truth, a theory of knowledge,
and a doctrine with ontological significance.
James, in a reply to Lovejoy, welcomed the distinctions as being healthy
whereas Lovejoy maintained the necessity of examining the various proposals
on their merits and accepting only a certain number of these.
The account of pragmatism that has been given in this thesis has been
genetic and expository rather than critical* In a section devoted to
conclusions it is necessary, however to leave the realm of exposition and
become mo e critical.
The strongest impression given by the totality of the writing of the
early pragmatists is the wide diversity of ideas stibsumed under the common
term pragmatism. There is, for example, the greatest difference between
Peirce and Schiller, yet both are called pragmatists. This tendency to
subsume varying and often opposed doctrines is common enough in philos-
ophy* Idealism, for example, is often used to mean quite varying doctrines*
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There is, however, more justification fir this in the case of idealism
because of its long history* Undoubtedly Lovejoy was right in his insist-
ence that pragmatiss needed to give far more attention to their differences
and the latent ambiguities within the doctrine*
Of the varying doctrines given the name of pragmatism two stand out as
of importance* The first of these is pragmatism as a philosophic method*
As a method it asserts that the only meaning a a hypothesis consists in its
consequences* This doctrine lies at the heart of Peirce 's pragmatism, although
it would also be a cepted by James and Dewey* For Peirce, two hypotheses are
identical if their consequences are the same* This doctrine is at once more
narrow and has the possibility of wider acceptance than the other aspects of
pragmatism* It is possible to hold this doctrine and subscribe to a cor-
respondence, coherence, or a pragmatic theory of truth* Whether pragmatism
as a method is as fruitful as its originator Peirce thought it to be is
another matter*
The second doctrine of great significance is the pragmatic theory of
truth. This doctrine is associated with James and Dewey* Neither Peirce
nor Schiller would have accepted it, but for different reasons. Pragpjatism
as a theory of truth would be of greater importance if true than pragmatism
as a method, but would not receive such general acceptance* This theory of
truth is novel and original* In one form or another it has become an
important part of a school of scientific methodology, operational! sm* It
is perhaps too early to know its futurebut its present vitality is a
matter of fact*
The theory of truth as satisfaction, advanced by Schiller, has been
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largely rejected because of its seemingly incurable ambiguity. Dewey end
Peirce would reject it unequivocally as would most non-pra^atists.
Pragmatism is somewhat of a watershed in American philosophy. It was
the first doctrine of importance to challenge the reigning idealism and
the precursor of what we now call naturalism. Most pragmatists are natur-
alists at the present time, although there is no intrinsic necessity for this
to be the case.
Pragmatism came to have a great influence in law, sociology, economics,
and theology. It is not possible to show this development in detail; it is
only necessary to point it out as showing the vitality of the movement.
In s\am it may be said that, although pragmatism is not, even at the
present time, clearly defined, it has been a healthy movement because it
shows the essential vitality of American philosophy. With its concern for
truth, it is a part of the major tradition in Europeaji and American philoso-
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Pragmatism began as a revolt against Berkeleian and Hegelian idealism.
The touchstone of the doctrine is its faith in empiricism. Although discussed
as early as the 1870’s, pragmatism was not given formulation until 1878 by
Peirce. The movement is generally considered to have started in 1904.
As the movement developed, however, Peirce became dissatisfied with the
meanings the term had taken. To express his precise meaning he chose the term
pragmaticism . For Peirce pragmaticism was a philosophic method, a maxim of logic,
and a metaphysical doctrine stressing scholastic realism. Truth was conceived v
by Peirce as a universe of universes. The doctrine bore no relation to psy-
chology. He often called it a modified Kantianism.
James conceived of pragmatism as a method for demonstrating radical
empiricism. Radical empiricism consists of three parts: the postulate that
the material of philosophic debate needs to be drawn from experience, the
statement of fact that the relations of conjunction are as important as dis-
junction, and the conclusion that reality is an experience continuum. The
doctrine was criticized from several quarters. Fite, for example, maintained
that pure experience was always coextensive with subjective experience.
James asserted against this criticism a realism with its belief in the reality
of extra-cental facts. The Miller-Bode objections, the most searching made,
pointed out that if pure experience antedated the distinction of subject and
object, then, experience coul-d not maintain both their uniqueness and common-
ness in a common external world. James was never able to answer these objec-
tions to his satisfaction.
For James pra^atism was a theory of truth as well as a philosophic
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method for demonstrating radical empiricism; he maintained them as early as
1898 ,
James’s friend Royce criticized pragmatism from the standpoint of
absolute idealism. The possibility of truth or error for Royce depended on
the existence of an infinite judge, the Absolute. James maintained against
this that the truth relation could be expressed in terms falling within the
finite mind.
James's version of pragmatism was also criticized as being a mere re-
editing of positivism or simply an appeal to action. Such criticism, James
maintained, rested on misunderstanding.
Dewey describes philosophy as having three areas of study represented
by three concentric circles: the inner circle concerned with reflective logic,
or inquiry, the second circle includes the aesthetic, scientific, and religious
realms, and the third deals with social problems. These three areas are inter-
related.
In his early years Dewey was an idealist holding both to a belief in in-
nate ideas and a doctrine of internal relations. By means of these doctrines
he has fought dualism, discontinuity, and passivity throughout his philosophic
career. As a result of the teachings of psychology and Darwinian biology he
came to reject idealism.
In place of idealism Dewey developed his instnimentalism, a theory rooted
in logic. Traditional logic was intellectual gymnastic and transcendental
logic left no reality but universal mind. Thought for Dewey was a doubt
inquiry process.
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teleological conception of mind* It has stressed an experimental theory of
knowledge; truth is verifiability. James and Schiller's theory of truth as
satisfaction Dev/ey rejected.
Schiller's doctrine he termed hmanisra. Its closest historical affilia-
tion is to Protagoras. Objective truth is to be reached by the recognition
of distinctions of value among perceptions recognized and shared by all.
Metaphysics thus has an ethical basis. The knowing process itself is a sample
of reality; in fact it is the only sample we have. This doctrine required a
reform in logic for logic cannot be separated from the abstract conditions of
thinking.
Schiller's pragmatism was fully explicit by I89I. It is an ethical theory
of truth; truth is satisfaction. This doctrine was in juxtaposition to the
theory of truth as verifiability in James's Pragmatism . Bradley criticized
the doctrine that truth attached to ideas by their mere practical working.
By I9C8 Lovejoy had distinguished thirteen varieties of pragmatism
falling into four categories: pragmatism as a theory of meaning, an episte-
mologically functionless theory of truth, a theory of knowledge, and an onto-
logical doctrine. James welcomed these distinctions as being essentially
healthy rather than a sign of inconsistency.
The strongest impression given by the totality of pragmatist writings
is the wide diversity of meaning attached to the term. Two of these varying
doctrines, however, are of the utmost importance. The first of these is
pragmatism as a method for the testing of hypotheses. This is a narrow use
of the term and would no doubt be fairly generally accepted. Pragmatism as
a theory of truth is considerably more important, if true, but it would by no
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means receive as universal acceptance as pragmatism as a method. The theory
of truth as satisfaction is generally rejected because of its ambiguity.
Pragmatism on the whole has been a healthy movement, with its many







This appendix will give some account of two aspects of the pragmatic
movement which became noticeable in the latter years covered by this
thesis. First, it became apparent that pragmatism was literally a “new
name for some old ways of thinking." This was to say that perusal of
the history of philosophy showed that there had been several quite
striking anticipations of pragmatism in earlier thinkers. Several of
these historical forerunners are considered in this appendix—not
because they are the only anticipations of the movement, but because in
the philosophical journals articles were devoted to comparison of this
earlier thought with certain pragnatic doctrines. Secondly, pragmatism
began to have an effect abroad. It is one purpose of this appendix to
consider this effect in so far as reports of it were published in
philosophical journals.
Undoubtedly every philosophic movement, after expanding beyond a
doctrine and becoming wide enough in its signification to include many
and diverse minds, exhibits both of these tendencies. In connection
with pragmatism's historical progenitors, there is good reason for them
to be readily discoverable. Pragmatism had tap-roots in two well
established Eluropean traditions: the anti -intellectual, voluntaristic
tendencies in German idealism, and in British empiricism. Schiller
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more than suggested as partial inspii^tion for the movement; justifica-
tion for this point of view would lead far beyond the confines of this
thesis
•
Pragmatism, although thus a part of both a continental and a British
tradition, had about it a distinctly American flavor* It is, therefore,
interesting to study the effect of the movement in various countries, each
a part of the European philosophical tradition, but also with its own dis-
tinctive traditions and ideas of what were the important philosophical
problems* To predict beforehand, however, the reception the movement
might be expected to receive would be dangerous. As well as traditions,
the philosophic enterprise has its elements of novelty and contingency
brought about by individual genius.
2
Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Forerunner of Pragmatism
In 1909 Albert Schinz wrote an article entitled "Jean Jacques
Rousseau, A Forerunner of Pragmatism." Aside from the intrinsic in-
terest of this article, it is interesting from another point of view.
Schinz, a professor at Bryn Mawr, was the author of a book, Anti-
Pragmatism , and as this title would suggest, it was a vigorous polemic
against pragmatism.
The first pert of this book consisted of a refutation of pragma-
tism. The "refutation" reduced the problem of pragmatism to a dilemma.
Either pragmatism is the same thing as scientific method, or it is not.
If it is the same as scientific method, then, there is not need for it.
If it is the same as scientific method, and there is certainly a move-
ns
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ment callad pragmatlam ae the llteratwe will testify, what is it? It
ia, according to Sohinz, a reduction of philosophy to ethic 0 . In the
Middle Ages the conception of philoeophia ancilla theologiae reigned.
Pragmatism' is a return to scholasticism in so far as it would bring
about philoeophia ancilla ethicae .
Schinz develops the thesis that pragmatism is good and ought to
triumph. Pragmatism is not, however, true. Ultimately it exists only
to prove the dogmas that man's will is free, providing for hie moral
responsibility, and that a good God governs the world. Pragmatism de-
ceives us when it teaches these dogmas as true; really it should con-
sider them only as necessary beliefs. The author is perfectly willing
to drew the consequences of the argument. There are to be two truths,
one for the masses which is false, and one, the real truth, for scholars
Such an attitude of deceit, to be deliberately practiced by scholars,
would be wrong only if philosophers were responsible for the fact that
the truth is sad and unbearable for the masses. ^
r
The logic of this argument need not be considered. James, with
his usual latitudinarianism toward ideas, called the book an "interest-
ing sociological romance." The significance of the article to be con-
sidered can better be understood with the author's perspective in mind.
He develops a very similar argument in this article. In hie article on
pragmatism and Rousseau, ^ Schinz begins his argument with the following
definition of pragmatism;
1. The foregoing discussion is based on a review by Paul Carus of Anti-
Pragmatisme in the Monist, XIX, (I9O9 ).
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I define pragnatiem as a philosophy that judges of the value
of theories and ideas from their consequences, i*e*, from the
practical results which they yield to the thinker when he
proceeds to apply them to reality* 5
Such a rendering of the pragmatist doctrine, of course, is implied in
James’s Pragnatism and in Schiller* All of Schinz's references are to
James; the pragmatism of Schiller is not considered. There can bo no
objection to this definition of pragmatism if it is consistently main-
tained, and Schinz is careful to do this*
Next, the dialectic previously considered in connection with
Schinz *8 book Anti-Pragmatisme is offered* He says: ’’there is only
one alternative; if pragmatic results do not mean scientific results,
they must mean practical results from the point of view of practical
reason as opposed to our reason, in other words, ethical results*" ^
Schinz finds a remarkable symmetry in the philosophical evolution
of James and Rousseau. The work of each naturally falls into three
congruent periods* In the first place, both began with an enthusiasm
for pure science* With James, it was the natural sciences and medicine
to which he devoted his energies. In Book VI of the Oonfessione ,
Rousseau describes his studies in mathematics, and physics, and chem-
istry*
This scientific point of view became inadequate for the respective
interests of James and Rousseau* The second stage of development came
with an interest in psychology* With James, of course, the fruits of
5 * Schinz, Art *(1909)
4 * Schinz, Art *(1909)
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hie labors in this direction culmineted in hie Peychology . Roueeeau'e
efforts culminated in a book now unfortunately lost» entitled La Morale
Sensitive ou Le Materialisme du Sage « This work was written under the
influence of Lockean ideas and the work of Condillac. The central
thesis was that the dispositions of our soul depends on material con-
ditions* James's theory of emotions is analogous to this thesis of
Rousseau's* 5
Finallyt however, James and Rousseau decided for teleological con-
/
captions* In his Emile, a work of the last period in his develoimient,
Rousseau gives a tractate on the education of youth. Of the various
types of knowledge, the most important knowledge is not "to know what is,
but only to know what is useful." ("II ne e'agit pas de savoir, ce
qui est, mais seulsnent ce qui est utile*") Such a quotation from
Emile , according to Schinz, is not an isolated phenomenon: it is typi-
cal of the work as a whole*
It must be admitted that the pragmatism Schinz finds here is not
the remarkable similarity one might be led to expect from his intro-
ductory remarka* Both recognize the volitional aspects of man's nature^
making them both to that extent, a part of the anti-intellectualist
tradition*
As well as a general conception of pra^atism, James makes con-
crete application of it, particularly to religion* Thus James says:
5* The so-called James-Lange theory of emotions reduces the emotions
to a l^ysiological basis* We are sad because we weep as opposed to
the common-sense notion that we weep because we are sad*
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"If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will
be true, in the sense of being true for so much*" James adds up to this
"that for how much they are true, will depend entirely on their relations
to the other truths, that also have to be acknowledged*" ^ This latter
statement, according to Schinz, flatly contradicts the first sentence,
for "if pragmatic ideas have first right to be called truth, why bother
about other criterions?" ^ That there are difficulties in James's doc-
trine, there can be no doubt* ® Schinz, however, does not put his fin-
ger on the real difficulty* As Lovejoy, among others, has pointed out ^
the pragnatic criterion for the validity of a judgnent has latent ambi-
guities^ the variant possible meanings are not clearly distinguished by
pragmatists*
Rousseau also makes concrete application to religion from what is
essentially a pragmatist position* For this thesis, Schinz offers the
following quotation from Rousseau:
And if the Great Being did. not exist ••• it would still be
well that man should think of him (e'en occupat) constantly,
BO as to remain better in control of himself, to be stronger,
happier, and wiser*
Schinz apparently holds that this doctrine is analogous to James's will
to believe* The will to believe, however, means that in the presence of





8* Chapter III and IV above*




10* Cf* Oh. IV of this thesis.
11* Rousseau, Oeuvres, IV, 248*
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Ylew Rg oppoe«d to enoth«r» the IndlYldual has a right to hold a belief
which will promote the better life. This la far from holding a belief
which is considered to be false. James, in other \fords, rejects the
doctrine of the double truth, whereas apparently Rouseeeu accepts it.
The ethical aspect of the pragmatist doctrine was eo loosely for-
mulated by the early pregpjatiets as to be particularly subject to
misinterpretation. In this case, it would appear that in philosophical
evolution there is a certain parallel between James and Housseau. Sohlnz,
however, hae oertslnly made little case for Rousseau as a pragiisatlst; the
question ariees as to whethei* it is even possible to oall him a forerunner
on the besie of the evidence offered.
5
The Philosophy of Fichte In its Relation to Pragmetiaia
The early discussions of pragmatiam often centered about arother
name as holding a similar doctrir» to that of the pra^atist. This was
Fichte. Tho doctrine of Fichte’s thought to be similar to pragmatism was
the former 'a distirKstion between knowing and doing, or the practical and
the intellectual.
This relation, which on the surface seems to be close, was the
subject of a careful analysis in an article entitled "Tho Philosophy of
Fichte in its Relation to Pragmatisia ."^^As in the case of Schopenhauer,
the resemblances are more obvious then profound; the general physiognomy




According to Ttlbot, there is in Fichte a rocognition of an element
of conetraint in the thinkin;; process. Applying Fichte’s principle, she
eaye, ”Xt is not oiarely that, having agreed to thirJc in terse of Euclid-
ean space, 1 ou^t not to deny the truth of the Pythagorean proposition;
it la rather that 1 cpnnot deny it."
This eleaent of constraint in thought the pragoiatiel recognizes.
But, eaye Talbots
It is not enough siiiply to point to the fact that the process
of oxperionco is aotuelly to an extent deterained end con-
strained, in order to overcoiae ths force of the obiection
that on pragnsetist principles it ought not to bo.
This charge, that for the pragostiet there should bo no antecedent reali-
ty, oven though the pragnatiet might claim one, I*? a common interpreta-
tion. Ja-mes's Intention was to state clearly a realistic doctrine.
This would make such an Interpret tion Impossible. He was not, however,
alwaye sueceeeful in thie endenvor, end he was consequently freq-uently
misunderstood.
Talbot’s interpretation of Fichte stresses the importiittce of this
element of constraint in Fichte's interpretation of the nctur© of thought;
it 1& obvious she feels it to be valid and necessary. Thus, she eeys:
"In every intellectual prooees that reaches completion, we come, at some
stage or another, face to face with a 'not ourselves' which constrains
15 . Talbot, Art.(19C7).
14. In this article no clear reference is made as to whose version of
pragmatism ic under discuesion. Jpmea is the only one mentioned.
15 . Talbot, Art.(lpC7).
16 * Of. Rogers, "Professor James’s Theory of Knowledge,*'. Ehil. Rev» **XY.
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U8 to conform If we would know."^® Although e crltlolea of Talbot*#
article le not the purpoce here. It ahould be pointed out that both
Jaaaee and 3chlller» if not Dewey# were well aware of the dlffloultiee
mentioned above* Thus, for example Schiller eaye:
Mere poetulatlng la not In general enough to conetitute
an axiom. ••• The couree of poatulation does not al-
ways run eraooth. CJompl lance with son© of our deaonda
la only extorted from the refreetory aeterial of our
world by much effort# and ingenuity and repeated
trial.
Fichte *e doctrine atreeeee the primacy of the preetlcal reaeon#
an emphaeia which would ooem to be moat acoeptcble to the pragaatlet.
Last# however# It should be felt that there exists more similarity
between Fichte and the pragrastiats than exiats# Talbot hastens to say
of Fichte’s doctrine*
his doctrine does not aosn that our morel nature can
sstebllah for us theoreticcl propoBltione which the
intellect is unable to establish. It means that cer-
tain propositions whloh w« ar© wont to eell theoreti-
oal ere not thsoretleel after all.
On the other hand, the prspiatlst would say that beceuse the individual
has chosen to order hie life in s certain way# to desire certain things
judgaente# in particular oases# may vary as a result of different de-
sires. These doctrines are not equivalent » as ia so often the case#
a alight difference in the eolation of fundamental problems results
In s radloclly different end-produots.
18. Talbot, Art.(1907).
19* James 'e reoo^piition of the difficulty lies been discussed.
20. Schiller, in Sturt, PI, 91-92.
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Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism
If the history of philosophy were ransc^d for anticipators of
pragmatism, a name sure to be mentioned would be that of Schopenhauer*
On the svirfaoe of it at least, there is a marked resemblance in one im-
portant respect, their view of the intellect* For Schopenhauer "the in-
tellect as it ordinarily exists, knowledge as men ordinarily possess it,
is of an entirely practical character." "Ideas are guides to action,
motives rather than anything else*" Such a doctrine obviously has
more than a superficial resemblance to pragmatism.
In an article entitled "Schopenhauer's Contact with Pragmatism"
a careful analysis of the doctrines of Schopenhauer possibly connected
with pragmatism are given. The author, W* M* Salter, makes the follow-
ing remark concerning the problem:
I am not sure whether it is right to say that the general
view makes an approach to present day pragmatism or not.
In certain ways it sounds like it, but I am diffident about
making positive assertions, for though I have written an
article about pragnatism, I am not sure I understand it* ^5
A close examination, however, leads Salter to the belief that
Schopenhauer transcends the pragmatic point of view. In reference to
Schopenhauer's view of the intellect, Salter says:
The intellect in itself, in its own proper activity, has
nothing necessarily to do with what comforts, satisfies,
or gratifies the will. ... The intellect, following its
22* Schopenhauer, Werke, III, 525*
25* Schopenhauer, wer^. III, 450.
24. Salter, Art. (1910)“.
25. Salter, Art.(1910).
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Instinct and law purely» seeks the object as it exists in*
dependently of ourselves, as it would be whether we with
our wants and cravings and will were here or no*
Schopenhauer's view of the intellect, then, is that, in its higher ex-
ercise, it leaves practical consideratione entirely to one side* This
certainly bears no resemblance to pragmatism* Salter's references to
prag;matism in this article are scant; he is more concerned with 8in ex-
position of Schopenhauer* He dose, however, refer to the pragmatic
point of view, without further elaboration of what he considers this
point of view to be. This is unfortunate because the doctrine was, of
course, all things to all men* The force of hie argument is considerably
weakened 'by this omission*
Salter believes that not only does Schopenhauer's general point of
view transcend pragmatism, but also in more specific applications*
Schopenhauer's well-known philosophy of art is cited as a case in point*
The absolute condition of art is that the self be disengaged from the
will - the contrary of every interest but the aesthetic* On this view,
says Salter, "everything in the world, if it can only be objectively
viewed and seen as the expression of its idea, is beautiful*" Such a
conception rises above what Salter calls the pragmatic point of view*
Rousseau, Fichte, and Schopenhauer are not the only thinkers in
whose thought possible anticipations of pragmatism might be found* For
example, Kant and Nietzsche are often mentioned as historical forerun-
ners of the doctrine* Their thought is not considered here for two
26* Salter, Art.(1910)
27* Salter, Art *(1910)
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reasone. In the first place, In the period covered by this theeie, the
thought of Kant and Nietzsche was not treated in the philosophic jour-
nals for its pragmatic implications. Secondly, as the historical
thinkere considered illustrate, it is not particularly fruitful to
search for modem doctrines in past thinkers. Although pra^atism may
be simply a "new name for some old ways of thinking," it has a decidedly
modern cast. It arose as a protest against certain alleged difficulties
encountered in modern idealism, not as a component of a perennial phi-
losophy.
5
The Flourishing Italian School
Pragmatism, as a distinct movement, was not, in general, exported
abroad. It was an American product and largely confined to America.
If seen as a part of a widely spread anti-intellecttialist trend, prag-
matism had its duplications in other countries; the ideas were in the
air. There is, however, one' exception to this general consideration.
In Italy from approximately I9O5 to 1907, a small band of enthusiasts,
inspired by James and Schiller, propagated the doctrine vigorously. It
is to this* movement that attention will next be given.
This group, composed of ^ literary men and teachers, published a
journal. The Leonardo , at their own expense, containing numerous arti-
cles on pragmatism, including its history and leaders, and reviewed
the works of pragmatists as they appeared. Their version «f pragmatism
was relatively moderate. Published in the pages of the Monist were
several articles by one of the leaders of this group, Giovanni Vailati
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One of these ax^iclee in particular givee an excellent Idea of his ver>
p Q
aion of pragmatism.
The most important of Vailatl*s articles published in the Moniet
was entitled, "Pragmatism and Mathematical Logic." This article,
more general than its title would imply, contains a clear formulation
of what Yailatl considered the principle tenets of pragmatism to be.
His introductory remarks in this article are indicative of the nature of
the movement as he conceived it. He says:
It is certainly not one of the least of the merits of the
Leonardo that it has established lines of commxmication and
encouraged exchange of ideas between exponents of philosophi-
cal studies belonging to the most diverse and distinct in-
tellectual fields - between logicians and aesthetic ians,
between moralists and economists, mathematicians and mystioe,
biologists and poets.
There exists, according to Vailati, an intimate connection between
pragmatism and logic. As is well known, Peirce thoug|ht of his pragpia-
tism as a logical maxim, but it is not from Peirce that Vailati de-
rivee, but from the Italisn mathematician, Peano. The first of these
connections is:
A common tendency to regard the value, and even the meaning
of every assertion as being intimately related to the use
which csn be made ••• for the deduction and construction of
groups of consequences. 51
28. Perry, TOWJ, II, 570-579» from which the foregoing was taken, gives
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This is to say that mathematical logicians regard postulates as proposl
tlone not per se more acceptable but rather on a par with all others.
James's doctrine of "the will to believe" and Schiller's "axioms as
postulates” are closely allied to this doctrine.
The second intimate connection Vailati discovers is "their eoemion
repugnance to the vague, indefinite, generic; and inrtheir care to
analyze every assertion into its simplest terms." This, no doubt,
is a principle for which, in theory at least, general agreement might
be found among philosophers. It is questionable whether the pragmatist
escaped the 'vague and indefinite* any more than other philosophers.
A third common interest of the pragmatist and the mathematical
logician is in historical researches in the development of scientific
theories. It was Peano, according to Vailati, who first realized that
many discoveries of modern mathematics were "hothing more than the
introduction of new methods of notation for processes" given other
names by their predecessors. Such a theory, carried to an extreme,
results in logical positivism, a school deriving much from Peano.
Mathematical logicians are concerned with the theory of definition
Their results in this area have aided the pragmatist position against
"the 'agnostic* prejudice which attributes the impossibility of the
human mind to penetrate to the essence of things." ^
The version of pragmatism suggested in the foregoing is relatively
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source of inspiration, it can be readily seen that hie work; has much in
ccanmon with Peirce* However, during the period in which this school was
most active, Peirce's work was relatively unknown* Scattered papers of
his had been published but the vast bulk of his work in this area was
unknown*
Another article of some interest' from the pen of Vailati was also
published in the pages of the Monlet * 55 This article, entitled "A
Pragmatic Zoologist,'* dealt with the connection of the work In zoology
of a certain Griardina and the pragmatic approach he follows in his
work* This Giardina, according to Vailati:
*** expounds clearly and accurately the pra^atic conception
of scientific theories as expressions of conditional expec-




During the years covered in this thesis, the French philosopher,
Andre Lalande, annually wrote an article for the Philosophical Review
treating of the most important books, movements, and events, in the
philosophy in the previous year in hie country* These articles were
long enough to permit a fairly detailed summary of the chief currents
of thou^t in any given year* It is, therefore, interesting to dis-
cover in these yearly articles the number of times pragmatism is men-
tioned and the comparisons that were made with French covinterparta of
the movement*
55* Vailati, Art *(1908)
56* Vailati, Art *(1906)
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The first of Lalande'a articles to discuss pragmatism was an
article in I9O6 . In this article comparison was made between the
early works of the so-called neo-critical school in France—composed
of such men as Renouvier, Boutroux, Poincare, and Bergson—and prag-
matism. This neo-critical school introduced James to France. There
is no doubt that James was influenced by all of the men mentioned in
connection with this neo-critical school. The interesting ques-
tion arises of any possible influences that pragmatism—equating it
only with James's version of pragmatism at this point—may have had
upon these thinkers.
Answering this question in detail, although an enchanting bypath,
would not be relevant here. A partial answer can be suggested, however.
The resemblance in many of the doctrines of James and Bergson have
already been mentioned. Noticing these similarities, several
thinkers have suggested a possible influence of James on Bergson.
Bergson's reply to this suggestion is reproduced in part by Lalande.
In a letter Bergson said;
the need is felt by a great many thinkers in all countries of
a philosophy more truly empirical, and more closely allied
with the immediately given than was the traditional philosophy
which was elaborated by philosophers who were primarily mathe-
maticians.
James and Bergson became close friends and undoubtedly had a great
influence on one another. This denial of influence by Bergson, it should
57 • Lalande, Art.(1906).
58 . Chapter II of this thesis.
59» Chapter II of this thesis.
40. Lalande, Art.(1906).
41. Bergson in Lalande, Art.(l906).
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be noted, is only to an early Influence on Bergaon's thought, a conclu-
ii?
eion eubetantiated from other eouroee. James and Bergson were ex-
travagant in their appreciation of one another's merits. There was never
a question of priority of views between them.
The term pragmatism appeared in French thought with a different
signification than in America, through the writings of Blondel, author
of a book entitled L'Action . Blondel, however, coined the term without
reference to or knowledge of the American movement. ^5 He was influenced
by Boutroux. Blondel 's central thesis was that thought ultimately leads
to the necessity of an act of absolute faith in a positive religion. In
LL
Blondel 's case this was Roman Catholicism. ^
Pragmatic fideism, an aspect of the movement deriving from James
and Schiller, was extolled by the group surrounding Bergson. Many of
these carried his spiritualistic metaphysics to greater lengths than did
he. One of these, Vilbois, is spoken of by Lalande as follows:
A church with dogmas, sacraments, a liturgy, the Eucharistical
ceremony which symbolizes the communion of souls and actualizes
our participation in the permanent resurrection of Christ -
such appear to him to be, not exactly the necessary deductions,
but at least the normal complements, of a pragmatic theory of
meaning.
La Revue de Philosophie. an ecclesiastical magazine, extolled James
as giving a method of proving orthodox beliefs. James's doctrine was
42. Perry, TCWJ, II, 519-6I6 .
45* His derivation is given by Lalande, Art.(1906).
44. According to Perry, Catholic Modernism owes little or nothing to
pragmatism. It, therefore, is outside the scope of this thesis. Blondel
may be considered as a representative of this movement.
45 . Lalande, Art.(l906).
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spoken of in this magazine as follows: "Wa are accustomed to judge a
^
tree by its fruits; this is only a new and more systematized form of
the argument ex oonse .uentiis *** ^
The foregoing discussion is the only summary of pragmatism as it
effected French thought in Lalande's series of articles. There are
other references to the neo-critical school and suggestions of their
connection with the pragmatic movement, but detailed elaboration is not
given. The opinion of Lalande on the relation of pragmatism to French
thought is interesting. He says; "We must, therefore, regard all those
similarities as the expression of the same general state of mind."
7
A German Criticism of Pragmatism
Pragmatism never gained a foothold in Germany. The works of James
were known through the translation of a Wilhelm Jerusalem but apparently
they were not destined to have any profound effect on German thought.
Mach, Slmmel, and Ostwald, all greeted James as allies, but the most
Influential portion of their work was adopted by the positivists and
was not of a pragmatic turn. In the literature in the journals of the
period, at least in America, there is no record of pragmatism’s having
had an effect.
Lq
However, in a survey of German thought in 1908» ^ there is a
criticism of pragmatism throwing some light on the German reception of
r
46. Quoted in Lalande, Art.(1906).
47* Lalande, Art.(1906). This opinion concurs with Perry, TCWJ, 11,600.
48. Swald, Art.(1909).
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the moTement* Ewald, the author of this article, characterizes the
1^
thought of his country as follows:
Gennan philosophy in the last ten years shows a continuous
and clean line of development. ••• Contemporary German phi-
losophy presents a revival of idealistic speculation. ^
Some estimate of the reception of pragmatism on German thinkers
can be gained from the author's discussion of the Third International
Congress of Philosophy at Heidelburg, at which pragmatism was discussed*
Royce brought up the problem of truth as mediate between epistemology
metaphysics. According to Royce 's analysis, there were three concep-
tions of truth: the instrumental, which viewed the truth as the prod-
uct of biological adaption; the individualistic, which saw truth as
the arbitrary product of the individual will; and the absolutistic,
conceiving of truth as over-individual and eternal. In this contri-
bution, Ewald says:
Royce attempted to bring about a synthesis of these throe
views, by interpreting the absolutistic conception, not
intellectually, but voluntaristically, as the form and
norm of will. In this way, he aims to convert transcenden-
talism into terms of pragmatism, to reconcile epistemology
with the claims of will.
In the discussion which followed Royce' s address two relatively dis-
parate groups combined in an attack on pragmatism. Says Ewald:
As much as pragmatists formulated pragmatism in terms of the
instrumentalist or biological concept of truth, the funda-
mental conceptions of the aprioristic school was challenged,
and all the groups of neo-Kantians and noo-Pichteans com-
bined in combatting the theory, which threatened to resolve
the fundamentel principles of knowledge into subjective
relativism. 51
49. Ewald, Art.(1909). 51* Ewald, Art.(1909).
50. Ewald, Art.(1909).
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This discussion climaxed the Congress and was farorable to the aprior-
Istlc conception of Royce.
The very lack of evidence on pragmatism in Germany in the journals
attests the fact that the movement was largely ignored, this in the
period when the literature of pragmatism, descriptive, polemic, and
historical, filled the journals*
Consideration of the reasons for pragmatism's failure to take root
abroad must remain largely in the realm of conjecture. To deal with
the reasons for a climate of opinion is difficult and often arbitrary.
The fact is, however, that pra^atism was indigenous to America and
largely confined to this country. The assertion frequently made, ^
usually with derogatory intent, is that it is the philosophy of the
American businessman or typically American with its emphasis on prac-
ticality and action, which may not be completely unfounded but it is
certainly superficial. In regard to the extent pragmatism was under-
stood abroad, it suffered there approximately its fate in America; it
was frequently misunderstood. As is implied in Love joy's article,
"The Thirteen PragnatiMas, " this may be the fault of the pragpiatists
because of their failure to formulate their views with sufficient pre-
cision* It is clear, moreover, that the acceptance of one version of
pragmatism by no means necessitates an acceptance of all versions of
the doctrine.
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